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UNDO UNDUE HARDSHIP:  
AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO DISCHARGING  
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Aaron N. Taylor
A debtor seeking to discharge student loans in bankruptcy must 
prove that paying the debt would cause an undue hardship upon him and 
his dependents.  Undue hardship, however, is an undefined concept, 
flummoxing debtors, creditors, and judges alike.  The result of this 
ambiguity is rampant inconsistency in the manners in which similarly-
situated debtors (and creditors) are treated by the courts.  This Article 
argues that the undue hardship standard should be replaced by a 
framework that uses debt service thresholds to determine the propriety of 
federal student loan bankruptcy discharges.  Eligibility for discharge would 
depend on outstanding loan amounts, debtor income history, federal 
poverty guidelines, and the type of academic program in which the loan was 
incurred.  The goals of the framework would be two-fold: 1) to provide an 
impartial, economical, and uniform means of assessing the propriety of 
federal student loan discharges, and 2) to provide debtors facing crushing 
student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a simplified avenue 
of relief in bankruptcy. 
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*  *  * 
INTRODUCTION 
What does undue hardship mean? 
Poverty or something less extreme? 
The standard Congress left undefined 
Prompting both debtors and creditors to whine 
Judges have been given the difficult task 
Of making sense of the mess at hand   
Selecting which test should be imposed 
Brunner? Johnson? Totality? Who knows?! 
Should debtor good faith play a part? 
What about debtor’s right to a fresh start?
And in cases where hardship is undue, 
Does full, partial, or hybrid discharge ensue?   
Just some of the questions that come to mind, 
Due to the standard left undefined 
So with clarity and fairness overrun 
Undue hardship should be undone.1
When Congress first imposed the undue hardship standard upon debtors 
seeking to discharge student loans in bankruptcy, it intended the standard to 
be the final barrier against debtor abuse.2  Congress reasoned that the very 
viability of the federal student loan program required that only honest 
debtors receive relief.3  Through the years, however, Congress fashioned the 
1 This fit of artistic indulgence was inspired by a bankruptcy judge’s poetic means of 
lamenting the “unusual and confusing language” contained in the automatic dismissal 
provision of 11 U.S.C. § 521. In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). 
2 156 CONG. REC. E570 (2010) (statements of Rep. Steve Cohen) [hereinafter Cohen 
Remarks] (“Congress’s intent in enacting [the undue hardship] provision back in 1978 was 
to protect Federal student loan programs from fraud and abuse by student borrowers and 
ultimately to protect the taxpayer dollars that fund Federal student loan programs.”). 
3 Id.; see also, e.g., Claxton v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n (In re Claxton), 140 B.R. 565, 
570 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (reasoning that when debtors repay student loans, “they are 
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undue hardship barrier into a bulwark, representing the sole means of 
getting student loans discharged in bankruptcy.4  But while repeatedly 
increasing the standard’s prominence, Congress failed to increase its clarity.  
Undue hardship is an undefined concept, flummoxing debtors, creditors, 
and judges alike.5  The result of its ambiguous contours is rampant 
inconsistency.  Judges define the standard differently,6 they impose 
different conceptual tests on debtors,7 and when undue hardship is found, 
relief is often dependent upon judicial philosophy rather than the merits of 
the case.8  In the end, similarly-situated debtors (and creditors) are treated 
differently based on the courts in which they find themselves, leaving an 
irony where inconsistency is the most consistent aspect of the standard’s 
application.   
Inconsistency is not the only shortcoming of the undue hardship 
standard.  The premise underlying the standard’s purpose is also 
illegitimate.  In the 1970s, the media began to tap into concern about the 
“rising tide of bankruptcies”,9 and sensational stories about doctors and 
lawyers receiving student loan discharges “on the eve of embarking on 
lucrative careers” began to damage public perceptions of the loan 
program.10  In response, Congress restricted the circumstances in which 
helping to make education available for others,” and therefore Congress intended for 
student loan debtors’ right to relief to “yield to some extent”).
4 See generally B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time 
Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 89 (2002) (providing a history of student loan discharge provisions). 
5 In re Claxton, 140 B.R. at 568 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘undue 
hardship;’ and it is not clear exactly what it is that debtors must prove.”). 
6 Compare Skaggs v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Skaggs), 196 B.R. 865, 867 
(Bankr. W.D. Okla 1996) (reasoning that “undue hardship” should be defined using “the 
plain, ordinary meaning of those words”), with Heckathorn v. United States ex rel. U.S. 
Dep't of Educ. (In re Heckathorn), 199 B.R. 188, 194-95 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) 
(“Although the words ‘undue’ and ‘hardship’ are common English words, their 
combination in this statute obviously constitutes a term of art, i.e., a phrase with a 
particular legal meaning and function, which is based on but may be more specialized than 
common usage.”).
7 Kopf v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (discussing 
the predominant tests courts use to determine undue hardship). 
8 See, e.g., Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866, 870-74 
(Bankr. D. N.H. 2000) (providing overview of three judicial approaches to student loan 
discharge: full, partial, and hybrid). 
9 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 2 (1973) (“The most dramatic fact about bankruptcy 
administered under the present Act is the rising tide of bankruptcies since World War II.”).
10 Frank T. Bayuk, Comment, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship 
Exception, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1094  (2004). 
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student loans could be discharged, making loans non-dischargeable within 
the first five years of repayment,11 but still dischargeable thereafter.  
Accompanying this new restriction was an exception that allowed for loans 
in repayment for less than five years to be discharged in cases where a 
debtor could prove that paying the loans would cause an undue hardship 
upon him and his dependents.12  In the years to follow, Congress would 
lengthen and eventually remove the period of mandatory repayment, 
making the undue hardship exception the only path to student loan 
discharge.13  This gradual tightening was premised on preventing abuse of 
the bankruptcy system and the student loan program by crafty debtors.14
However, the anecdotal evidence on which Congress relied has not held up 
to empirical scrutiny.15
The undue hardship standard has another deleterious effect: it makes it 
difficult for debtors to discharge debt incurred as a result of lack of 
information or misinformation about educational offerings.  Most students 
choose a college based on very limited information.  Information regarding 
school quality is sparse and, where it exists, often inscrutable.16
Additionally, information regarding the financial implications of attending 
college often comes too late, if at all.17 The resulting “information 
11NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 207 (1997), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html (follow links to relevant sections) 
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT1997]. 
12 Id. at 209. 
13 See generally Huey, supra note 4 (providing a history of student loan discharge 
provisions). 
14 See, e.g., Cohen Remarks, supra note 2, at E570. 
15 See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 53-54 (“Notwithstanding the notoriety of 
‘scam’ bankruptcies, absconding and concealing debtors, and other instances of egregious 
conduct in, and in anticipation of, cases under the Act, the Commission has found little 
empirical substantiation that dishonest conduct is a cause of bankruptcy in a significant 
number of cases.”); cf. COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 82 (“But the statistical 
evidence suggests that consumers who file for bankruptcy today, as a group, are 
experiencing a financial crisis similar to the crisis faced by families when filing rates were 
only a fraction of their present levels.”).
16 BRIDGET TERRY LONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GRADING HIGHER EDUCATION: GIVING 
CONSUMERS THE INFORMATION THEY NEED 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/longpaper.pdf (“[T]he process of 
college choice involves simultaneously ranking options in multiple ways, relying on 
incomplete and uncertain information, and receiving little or no support for interpreting the 
facts that are available.”).
17 PAMELA BURDMAN, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE STUDENT DEBT 
DILEMMA: DEBT AVERSION AS A BARRIER TO COLLEGE ACCESS 9 (2005), available at
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/DebtDilemma.pdf (“There is no clear or 
established division of labor between high school officials, admissions and outreach offices 
and financial aid offices that ensures students receive the information they need when they 
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asymmetry”18 creates an environment where students are more susceptible 
to bad educational matches19 or to being victimized by misrepresentations 
or other improprieties.20  When a student attends a school based on lack of 
information or, worse yet, false information, her chances of completing the 
program are diminished.21  And unfortunately, students who leave college 
without earning a credential are often saddled with student loan debt that 
they will likely have difficulty repaying.22
Few courts consider the value of the education received when making 
undue hardship determinations.23  The reasoning behind this approach is 
that the federal government is not “an insurer of educational value.”24  It has 
also been argued that a student loan is an individual investment, and 
therefore, the taxpayers should not be held responsible if the investment 
fails to pay off.25  However, victims of higher education misrepresentations 
are offered few avenues for redress by the courts or by regulatory 
agencies.26 Courts are reluctant to recognize certain types of claims against 
educational institutions.27  Regulatory agencies are more concerned with 
need it.”).
18 The term “information asymmetry” denotes the difference in access to information 
between education providers and education consumers.  David D. Dill, Allowing the 
Market to Rule: The Case of the United States, 57 HIGHER EDUC. Q. 136, 147 (2003). 
19 LONG, supra note 16, at 9 (“Without easily obtainable information and a clear map of the 
key factors worth considering and how to process them, there are many examples of 
decisions that probably represent ‘bad matches.’”).
20 Dill, supra note 18, at 147 (“[B]ecause higher education in the US is an industry in 
which consumers cannot objectively evaluate the quality of the service before they 
purchase it, an information asymmetry can exist in which institutions may take advantage 
of consumers.”). 
21 Brian A. Jacob & Tamara Wilder, Educational Expectations and Attainment 18 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15683, 2010) (“The fact that most students 
attain less education than they expect . . . suggests that misinformation is the cause of the 
gap.”).
22 See LONG, supra note 16, at 9 (“[A]lmost half of college students who attend a four-year 
institution fail to get a degree. Meanwhile, these students carry significant amounts of 
student debt that is not likely to be justified without receipt of a college credential.”).
23 The Brunner test is the dominant undue hardship test.   The court in Brunner argued that 
“[c]onsideration of [educational value] . . . is antithetical to the spirit of the guaranteed loan 
program.” Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 
752, 755 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
24 Id.
25 Id. at 755-56 n.3 
26 See Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers 
Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 
729 (2010). 
27 Id. at 763 (explaining how the judicial concept of academic abstention disadvantages 
plaintiffs in lawsuits against educational institutions).  
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protecting public interests than those of individuals.28  Thus, in order to 
provide some level of protection to students who receive little monetary 
benefit from their educational experiences, whether because of impropriety 
or simple misfortune, bankruptcy discharge should be a viable avenue of 
relief from the burdens of student loan debt.   
This Article argues that the undue hardship standard should be undone, 
replaced by a bright-line rule that uses debt service thresholds to determine 
the propriety of federal student loan bankruptcy discharges.29  Educational 
value plays a central role in the proposed framework, as eligibility for 
discharge would depend on outstanding loan amounts, debtor income 
history, federal poverty guidelines, and the type of academic program in 
which the loan was incurred.  The goals of the framework would be two-
fold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and uniform means of 
assessing the propriety of student loan discharges, and 2) to provide debtors 
facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a 
simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy. 
The Article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the factors that have 
made post-secondary education virtually obligatory, including how salary 
and labor market trends engender an investment mindset among students.  
Part II describes the speculative nature of educational investments.  Part III 
documents the trend towards increased education borrowing.  Part IV 
discusses the dismal educational outcomes that contribute to student loan 
over-indebtedness.  Part V explains how lack of information and 
misinformation influence students’ educational decisions.  Part VI 
highlights inconsistency and ambiguity in bankruptcy law, particularly in 
the area of student loan discharge.  And finally, Part VII presents the 
framework for using debt service thresholds to determine the propriety of 
student loan bankruptcy discharges. 
I: EDUCATION AS AN INVESTMENT 
We have all heard the axiom: Education pays.  This simple 
declaration serves as a compelling justification for undertaking—and in the 
process, investing in—higher education.  It is frequently the title 
encapsulation of studies,30 reports,31 and news articles32 extolling the virtues 
28 Id. at 731. 
29 Currently, the undue hardship standard is applied to private student loans in the same 
manner it is applied to federal loans in bankruptcy.  However, the framework proposed in 
this article would only apply to federal student loans for reasons discussed in VII.A.6.    
30 E.g., SANDY BAUM, ET AL., COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR.,EDUCATION PAYS 
2010: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY (2010),
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of education.  If higher education was a company, “Education Pays” would 
be its “Just do it.”  A review of relevant data shows that education does 
indeed pay—on a wide range of quality-of-life indicators.  Higher levels of 
education are associated with various job-related benefits, including higher 
salaries,33 better fringe benefits,34 and more job satisfaction.35  Education 
has also been tied to better health,36 increased parental effectiveness,37 and 
greater civic behavior.38
A. Salary Differences 
The decision to undertake higher education has been termed the 
“Million Dollar Question”.39  This characterization references the oft-cited 
difference in lifetime earnings between a college graduate and a high school 
graduate.40  Research has concluded that over the span of a 40-year career, 
college graduates will earn about sixty-six percent more in salary than high 
school graduates.41  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 
median weekly pay for bachelor’s degree-holders is $1,053, while the 
median for high school graduates is $638.42  These degree-based salary 
differences get larger as the comparisons get starker.  For example, the 
median salary for professional degree-holders is almost four times the 
median for individuals with less than a high school diploma.43  Also, the 
available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/Education_Pays_2010.pdf.   
31 See, e.g., Employment Projections: Education Pays, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (last modified 
March 23, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm. 
32 See, e.g., Jack Z. Smith, A Simple Lesson: Education Pays, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, March 
17, 2009, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/mar/17/a-simple-lesson-education-
pays/.  
33 See BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 10. 
34 See id.
35 Philip Oreopoulos & Kjell G. Salvanes, How Large are Returns to Schooling? Hint: 
Money Isn’t Everything 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Resarch, Working Paper No. 15339, 
2009). 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. at 12. 
38 See BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 10. 
39 Harvard researcher Bridget Terry Long coined this term as part of her research into 
college graduation rates. Answering the Million-Dollar Question: The Problem of College 
Attrition—Could Institutions Do More?, HGSE NEWS, Apr. 16, 2003,
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/features/long04152003.html.  
40 Id.
41 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 12. 
42 BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 31. 
43 Median weekly pay for professional degree-holders is $1,665 compared to $451 for less 
than a high school diploma. Id.
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wage premiums associated with schooling increase as time in school 
increases.  The first year of college is associated with an 11% median 
increase in earnings; the fourth year of college is associated with a 16% 
increase; and the second year of graduate or professional school is 
associated with a 19% increase.44
The data suggests that the salary benefits of education appear early 
in an individual’s career.  Among workers aged 25-34, bachelor’s degree-
holders make 50% more than high school graduates.45  As such, an 
individual is able to account for income lost while in school relatively early 
in her career.  At median salary levels, it has been estimated that it takes 
bachelor’s degree holders about eleven years to recoup expenses related to 
earning the degree, including actual expenses and lost salary.46  This means 
that the typical bachelor’s degree-holder “breaks even” on her education 
investment barely a quarter of the way into her 40-year career.  
The earnings premium on education has grown over the last thirty 
years.  During the period from 1980 to 2005, the earnings premium of a 
college degree (compared to a high school diploma) increased 22%.47
Another study found that the earnings premium between college and high 
school educated workers increased 30% between 1963 and 2009, albeit 
fitfully.48  Even after accounting for race and years of work experience, 
researchers conclude that earnings premium trends hold.49
44 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 17. 
45 SUSAN AUD, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION 
OF EDUCATION 2011, at 56 (2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011033.pdf (“[Y]oung 
adults with a bachelor’s degree earned more than twice as much as those without a high 
school diploma or its equivalent in 2009 . . . , 50 percent more than young adult high school 
completers, and 25 percent more than young adults with an associate’s degree.”).
46  BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7 (comparing the earnings of high school graduates to 
those of college graduates and concluding that at about the age of 33 “higher earnings 
compensate . . . for four years out of the labor force [and the] average tuition and fee 
payments at a public four-year university funded fully by student loans at 6.8% interest.”); 
cf. id. (“The earnings of associate degree recipients lead to a crossover at about the same 
age—after more years of work despite the lower tuition payments—because of the smaller 
earnings premium.”).
47 Jacob & Wilder, supra note 21, at 1. 
48 DAVID AUTOR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE POLARIZATION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN 
THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/job_polarization.pdf (“In 
1963, the hourly wage of the typical college graduate was approximately 1.5 times the 
hourly wage of the typical high school graduate. By 2009, this ratio stood at 1.95.  The 
entirety of this 45 percentage point rise occurred after 1980. In fact, the college-to-high- 
school earnings ratio declined by 10 percentage points in the 1970s.”).
49 See, e.g., BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 17. 
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The increased education premium is the result of both an increase in 
the inflation-adjusted earnings of college degree holders and a decrease in 
the earnings of high school educated workers.50  In fact, the decline in 
wages for those with just a high school diploma is described as a “major 
proximate cause” of the increased premium.51  But the larger cause of the 
trend is simple supply and demand.  The last thirty years or so have seen a 
decrease in the relative supply of college-educated workers.52  As the 
economy has demanded more highly skilled, or college-educated, workers 
and the relative number of such individuals entering the workforce has 
declined,53 employers have been willing to pay more for those workers.54
B. Economic Trends 
The modern economy is heavily tilted in favor of college-educated 
workers.  Technological advancements and foreign outsourcing have led to 
a polarization or “hollowing out” of job opportunities in the U.S.55  The 
salient characteristics of this trend are an accumulation of job growth at the 
extremes of the spectrum and a diminishment of “middle-wage, middle-
skill” jobs.56  For example, job growth in high-skill fields57  has been strong 
during the last few decades; even during the “Great Recession,”58
50 See AUTOR, supra note 48, at 26. 
51 Id. (“[M]ajor proximate cause of the growing college/high school earnings gap is not 
steeply rising college wages but rapidly declining wages for the less educated—especially 
less-educated males.”).
52 See id. at 1 (“[S]ince the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rise in U.S. education levels has 
not kept up with the rising demand for skilled workers, and the slowdown in educational 
attainment has been particularly severe for males. The result has been a sharp rise in the 
inequality of wages.”).
53 Id. at 25 (“[T]he skill demands of the U.S. economy did not stand still over the course of 
these decades even as college completion rates slowed. Consequently, college graduates 
are increasingly scarce relative to the set of jobs seeking them.”).
54 Id. at 6 (“One important proximate cause for the rising relative earnings of college 
graduates is the slowdown in the rate of entry of new college graduates into the U.S. labor 
market starting in the early 1980s.”).
55 Id. at 2. 
56 Id. at 1; see also id. at 1610. (describing middle-wage, middle-skill jobs as “Sales, 
office/admin, production, and operators”).  
57 Examples of high-skill jobs are “[m]anagerial, professional, and technical occupations.” 
See id. at 10. 
58 The term “Great Recession” is a popular reference to the recession that began in 
December 2007 and ended in June 2009.  See, e.g., Neil Irwin, It's Official: The Great 
Recession Ended Last Summer, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2010, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/political-
conomy/2010/09/its_official_the_great_recessi.html.  
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opportunities in this sector remained stable.59  Similarly, the low-skilled job 
sector60 survived the recession with no net job losses.61  On the other hand, 
middle-skill white-collar jobs declined by 8% and middle-skill blue-collar 
jobs fell by 16% between 2007 and 2009.62  Based on projections, job 
growth will be strongest in the high-skill, professional sector, followed by 
the low-skill, service sector.63  These trends demonstrate that the bulk of the 
well-paying job growth will be in fields that require highly educated 
workers who can think, adapt, and thrive in work environments increasingly 
dominated by technology.64  Middle-skill jobs that historically have 
required less than a bachelor’s degree will be increasingly replaced by 
machines or outsourced to lower-cost workers in other countries.65
The trend away from less-educated workers has already begun in 
earnest.  In 1973, workers with less than a college degree made up about 
72% of the workforce; by 2007, that proportion had fallen to just 41%.66
The actual numbers associated with these trends highlight the shift in even 
starker terms.  Between 1970 and 2007, the number of workers in the U.S. 
increased by 63 million to a total of 154 million.67  However, even with this 
70% increase, the total number of jobs for workers with less than a college 
degree fell by two million.68  Put differently, college educated workers 
netted 65 million new jobs over this 27-year period, which accounted for 
59 AUTOR, supra note 48, at 8 (“Employment growth in these high-skill occupations was 
robust throughout the past three decades. Even in the current recession, these occupations 
experienced almost no decline in employment.”).
60 Examples of low-skill jobs are “[“p]rotective service, food prep, janitorial/cleaning, 
personal care/services”.  See id. at 16. 
61 Id. at 4. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 12 (“The BLS forecasts that employment in service occupations will increase by 
4.1 million, or 14 percent, between 2008 and 2018. The only major occupational category 
with greater projected growth is professional occupations, which are predicted to add 5.2 
million jobs, or 17 percent.”).
64 Id. at 23 (“The secularly rising demand for literate, numerate, and analytically capable 
workers stems from the changing job requirements of a rapidly technologically advancing 
economy.”).
65 Id. at 2 (“The key contributors to job polarization are the automation of routine work 
and, to a smaller extent, the international integration of labor markets through trade and, 
more recently, offshoring.”).
66 HARVARD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY PROJECT: MEETING 
THE CHALLENGE OF PREPARING YOUNG AMERICANS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2011) 
[hereinafter PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY], 
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news_events/features/2011/Pathways_to_Prosperity_Feb2011. 
67 Id. 
68 Id.; see also id. (“[O]ver the past third of a century, all of the net job growth in American 
has been generated by positions that require at least some post-secondary education.”).
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42% of all the jobs in 2007.69  Add to that number the almost 26 million 
jobs that were already filled by college educated workers, and the extent of 
the tilt in their favor becomes more evident.  Moreover, economists project 
that of the 47 million jobs to be created between 2008 and 2018, college-
educated workers will fill almost two-thirds of them.70  This trend will push 
the overall percentage of workers with no college experience below 40%.71
C. Employment Trends 
Unsurprisingly, given job market trends, college-educated workers 
are more likely to be employed.  In fact, education has been called “a pretty 
good insurance policy for workers during the Great Recession.”72
According to 2012 BLS statistics, the unemployment rate fell as education 
level increased.73 The rate for individuals with bachelor’s degrees was 
4.9%, while the rate for individuals with high school diplomas was 9.4%.74
At opposite ends of the paradigm were individuals with doctoral degrees 
and those with less than high school diplomas—the latter having an 
unemployment rate almost six times higher than the former.75  Even when 
assessing the employment-to-population ratio, a broader measure of 
employment,76 it is clear that college-educated individuals fare much better 
in the job market.  In 2009, 82.5% of all college-educated individuals were 
employed, compared to only 67.253% of high school educated 
individuals.77  During the most recent recession, the employment-to-
69 Calculations by author. Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Calculations by author. Id. 
72 ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., DEGREEES OF SEPARATION: EDUCATION,




73 The unemployment rates for individuals with associate’s degrees or higher were lower 
than the 7.6% overall rate.  Individuals with lower levels of education had rates higher than 
the overall rate.  BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 31. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. (listing the unemployment rates for individuals with doctoral degrees and those with 
less than a high school diploma as 2.5% and 14.1% respectively). 
76 The employment-to-population ratio is calculated using the employment status of all 
non-institutionalized individuals of working-age (16 and up).  The unemployment rate is 
calculated using the employment status of working-age individuals, but only if they are 
employed or actively looking for employment.  As such, the pool of individuals accounted 
for in the employment-to-population ratio is larger.  See generally BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, BLS INFORMATION, GLOSSARY, http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm.  
77 BERUBE, supra note 72, at 3. 
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population ratio for individuals without a bachelor’s degree fell at a rate 
more than four times that of individuals with the degree.78
The benefits of education on employment transcend race and age.  
Blacks, whites, and Hispanics all see greater odds of employment with 
higher education.79 For blacks, the employment gap between bachelor’s 
degree-holders and those with only a high school diploma was almost seven 
percent; among whites and Hispanics, it was about 5%.80  Among 
individuals aged 25-30, an associate’s degree serves as an educational line 
of demarcation, with individuals at that level and above experiencing 
significantly better job prospects than those below.81  Interestingly, the 
benefits of education on employment do not just flow in the direction of the 
educated.  Among the twenty most educated metropolitan areas, sixteen 
experienced below-average declines in employment,82 and these favorable 
conditions seemed to protect less educated workers from some of the 
unfavorable trends experienced by similar workers elsewhere.83  In other 
words, high levels of educational attainment foster healthy job markets that 
benefit even the less educated in those areas.  
As part of a total compensation package, college educated workers 
tend to receive better fringe benefits than their less educated peers.  Access 
to employer-sponsored pension plans tends to be tied to education level,84
as does employer-sponsored health care coverage.85  College educated 
78 Id. (“The employment-to population ratio dropped by more than 2 percentage points 
from 2007 to 2009 for working-age adults without a bachelor’s degree, but fell by only half 
a percentage point for college-educated individuals.”).
79 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 21.
80 Id. 
81 PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 5 (“Among all groups, young adults—aged 
25 to 30—who have earned at least an associate’s degree, are significantly more likely to 
be employed than those who have a high school degree or less.”).
82 BERUBE, supra note 72, at 1 (“Among the 20 metro areas with the highest rates of 
bachelor’s degree attainment, only four registered declines in their overall employment-to-
population ratio from 2007 to 2009 that exceeded the national average.”).
83 Id. (“[E]mployment for workers without a high school diploma was also less impacted in 
these highly educated metro areas than in other markets.”).
84 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 23 (“[Seventy percent] of four-year college graduates 
were offered pension plans by their employers in 2008. Employer-provided pension plans 
were available to 65% of associate degree recipients, 61% of workers with some college 
but not degree, 55% of high school graduates, and only 30% of those who did not complete 
high school.”); see also id. (“Among those to whom these plans are available, participation 
rates are higher for individuals with higher education levels.”).
85 Id. at 24 (“In 2008, 68% of four-year college graduates working at least half-time in the 
private sector were covered by employer-provided health insurance. Only 50% of high 
school graduates had this benefit.”); see also id. (“The gap between health care coverage 
for high school graduates and four-year college graduates grew from 10 percentage points 
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workers tend to be employed in more prestigious jobs86 and report having 
higher job satisfaction.87  Better work lives seem to contribute to better 
personal lives.  Educated individuals are more likely to engage in leisure 
time activities,88 including volunteer work and other civic activities.89  This 
trend may be due to the better employment compensation and the greater 
autonomy afforded college educated workers.90  Many researchers have 
found a positive correlation between education and healthy lifestyle 
choices.91  Educated workers are less likely to smoke92 or be obese.93
Additionally, education has been tied to better parenting practices and 
outcomes.  The children of educated parents tend to be healthier,94 and they 
demonstrate higher cognitive ability95 than children of less educated 
parents.  The benefits of having educated parents persist throughout the life 
of the child, with better employment outcomes as an adult being a common 
manifestation.96  And if all those benefits were not enough, some 
researchers have concluded that education actually makes an individual 
more attractive.97
in 1979 to 14 percentage points in 1988, 17 percentage points in 1998, and 18 percentage 
points in 2008.”).
86 Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 8 (providing results of an occupational 
prestige study). 
87 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 19 (“In 2008, about 58% of college graduates and 
individuals with some college education or an associate degree reported being very 
satisfied with their jobs, while 50% of high school graduates and 40% of individuals 
without a high school diploma reported being very satisfied.”).
88 Id. at 28. 
89 Id. at 32. (“Both the percentage of people who donate their time to organizations and the 
number of hours people spend in volunteer activities are higher among individuals with 
higher levels of education.”); see also id. at 33 (“In every age group, adults with higher 
levels of education are more likely to vote than those with lower levels of education.”).
90 See generally Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 6. 
91 Id. at 10 (“Many studies find a strong positive correlation between schooling and 
multiple measures of health outcomes, healthy habits, and healthy activities, with this 
correlation remaining large after conditioning on income.”). 
92 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 27. 
93 Id. at 29. 
94 See, e.g., id. at 30.
95 Id. at 10. 
96 Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 12 (“For couples with children, parental 
schooling strongly relates to children’s development and social-economic success 
throughout life. Health, social integration, test scores, and labor market outcomes all 
correlate positively with both mother and father’s attainment.”).
97 Id. at 11 (reasoning that “[m]en and women with more earnings potential or with more 
prestigious jobs become more appealing in a competitive marriage market”).
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D. Societal Benefits 
This discussion would be incomplete without a mention of the 
societal benefits of education.  Because educated individuals tend to make 
more money, they also tend to pay more taxes.  Typically, a college 
educated worker will pay about 80% more in taxes than a high school 
educated worker.98  Higher education is also tied to less reliance on public 
assistance programs.99  In 2008, 8% of high school educated adults aged 25 
and older lived in households receiving food stamps, compared to 1% of 
adults with bachelor’s degrees.100  And because college educated 
individuals commit less crime, society saves on incarceration costs.101
When the benefits of education are added up, the grand total is immense.  
The societal savings from an individual completing a college degree, as 
opposed to only earning a high school diploma, “range from $32,600 for 
white women to $108,700 for black men.”102  So, does education pay?  
Indeed, it does. 
II. EDUCATION AS A RISKY INVESTMENT 
The payoff from education has cultivated an investment mindset 
among students.103  A recent study conducted by Gallup found that eighty-
four percent of surveyed students strongly agreed with the statement: 
College is an investment in my future.104  Seventy-four percent strongly 
agreed that “having a college degree is more important now than it used to 
98 BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 10. 
99 Id. (“Spending on social support programs such as unemployment compensation, food 
stamps, and Medicaid is much lower for individuals with higher levels of education.”).
100 Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 8. 
101 BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 4. 
102 These figures were calculated by estimating the reductions in public expenditures 
associated with social programs and incarceration. Id. at 22. 
103 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S., A CBO PAPER: PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO FINANCING COLLEGE EDUCATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter CBO
PAPER], http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4984/01-23-Education.pdf.
104 The survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a particular 
statement using a five-point scale, where a ‘5’ indicated strong agreement and a ‘1’ 
indicated strong disagreement.  SALLIE MAE & GALLUP, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR
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be.”105  And even with increased costs of attendance, more than half of 
students strongly agreed both that college is worth the cost and that they 
were willing to stretch themselves financially to attend the best college 
possible.106  This desire to attend college and willingness to pay for it are 
reflections of the investment mindset that has spurred widespread 
participation in higher education.  But, like all investments, educational 
investments are risky; some would say very risky.107
A. Salary Trends 
For starters, speculating on future trends is always a risky endeavor, 
particularly when information is limited and options are numerous.  The old 
investment adage “past performance does not necessarily predict future 
results” applies squarely to educational investments.  While higher 
education seems increasingly obligatory in the workforce, the relative 
payoff seems to be leveling off, if not waning.  Data compiled by the 
College Board showed that between 1998 and 2008, median salary 
increases for workers aged 25-34 with bachelor’s degrees barely exceeded 
inflation.108  For younger workers with associate’s degrees or some college 
experience, their salaries trailed inflation.109  So while workers with college 
experience fared better than other workers,110 the college investment looks 
surprisingly less favorable than the respondents to the Gallup survey would 
probably assume. 
Ironically, one of the most compelling illustrations of the risks 
associated with investments in higher education is the most cited 
justification for incurring those risks: salary differentials.  As discussed 
earlier, higher levels of education are associated with higher income.  But 
the “Education pays” mantra largely ignores the variable nature of 
educational outcomes.  Just because the median salary for bachelor’s degree 
holders is higher than that of individuals with only high school diplomas 
does not mean that every bachelor degree holder makes more money than 
105 Id. at 51. 
106 Id.; see also id. at 52 (indicating that more than 60% of respondents from the lowest 
income households strongly agreed with these statements). 
107 LONG, supra note 16, at 1 (citing high costs and low completion rates in describing “the 
college investment” as a “high-risk proposition”).  
108 BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 16. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (emphasizing that the decline in wages for younger workers with associate’s degrees 
or some college experience were not as steep as the declines for workers with only high 
school diplomas). 
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every person with just a high school diploma.111  For example, about 20% of 
male bachelor’s degree holders earn less than the median salary for high 
school graduates.112
Among women, 16% of bachelor’s degree holders earned less than 
the median high school graduate salary.113  Another study found that more 
than a quarter of individuals possessing a post-secondary certificate or 
license earned more than the median bachelor’s degree salary.114  These are 
not trivial exceptions.  According to Census data, 60 million adults aged 25 
and over possess bachelor’s degrees.115  So these exceptions represent 
millions of individuals whose education investments are not paying off to 
the extent they likely expected. 
A deeper review of the salary differential data reveals another 
important factor that often goes ignored: the publicized premium on higher 
education is often inflated.  As mentioned earlier, one reason for the 
increased education premium over the last three decades was an increase in 
the inflation-adjusted earnings of college graduates.116  Cursory 
consideration of this trend might lead one to conclude that recipients of all 
college degrees enjoyed the same, or a similar, premium.  However, most of 
the increase was experienced by workers with college degrees beyond the 
baccalaureate level.117  For example, between 1979 and 2007, the inflation-
adjusted earnings for men with bachelor’s degrees increased 10%; but the 
wages for men with graduate or professional degrees increased a much 
more robust 26%.118  For women, the inflation-adjusted earnings for 
bachelor’s degree and graduate or professional degree holders increased 
111 See, e.g., SANDY BAUM & SAUL SCHWARTZ, COLLEGE BOARD, HOW MUCH DEBT IS TOO
MUCH? DEFINING BENCHMARKS FOR MANAGEABLE STUDENT DEBT 7 (2006), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/06-0869.DebtPpr060420.pdf.
112 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7; see also id. (stating that 14% of males with only a 
high school diploma earned as much or more than the median salary for bachelor’s degree 
holders).
113 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 15-16 (stating that 13% of females with only a high 
school diploma earned as much or more than the median salary for bachelor’s degree 
holders). 
114 PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 3. 
115 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORE WORKING WOMEN THAN MEN HAVE COLLEGE DEGREES,
CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/education/cb11-72.html.
116 A decline in the earnings of workers with only a high school diploma was the other 
reason. AUTOR, supra note 48, at 26. 
117 Id. (“[A] sizable share of the increase in wages for college-educated workers relative to 
noncollege-educated workers since 1980 is explained by rising wages for workers with 
postbaccalaureate degrees.”).
118 Id.
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29% and 37% respectively.119  Combining these statistics, as is often done, 
likely overstates the payoff from earning a bachelor’s degree—and as a 
result understates the investment risks. 
B. Economic Trends 
There is also concern that economic trends may be threatening jobs 
of college educated workers in a manner previously experienced by workers 
in manufacturing fields that did not require much education beyond high 
school.  Nobel Laureate economist, Paul Krugman, states, “Many of the 
high-wage occupations that grew rapidly in the 1990s have seen much 
slower growth recently, even as growth in low-wage employment has 
accelerated.”120  The occupations to which Krugman is referring are among 
those that require higher education, and his conclusion acknowledges 
research showing that jobs in high-skill fields have become increasingly 
“tradable”, “offshoreable”, or susceptible to automation.121  One surprising 
finding is that jobs requiring higher levels of education might actually be 
more susceptible to offshoring than those requiring only low-levels.122
The prevailing view seems to be that it is the nature of a job, not the 
skill-level or education required, that determines its chances of being lost to 
foreign workers or to technology.  If the service can be “delivered [to its 
end user] electronically over long distances with little or no degradation in 
quality”, it is offshoreable (or tradable).123 If the job is sufficiently “rule-
based,” it can be automated.124  And these jobs are found across the skill 
119 Id. at 27. 
120 Paul Krugman, Degrees and Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/opinion/07krugman.html. 
121 “Tradable” and “offshoreable” are largely synonymous concepts theorized by 
economists seeking to describe the extent to which an industry and the jobs therein are at 
risk of being lost to cheaper workforces in other countries. J. Bradford Jensen & Lori G. 
Kletzer, Tradable Services: Understanding the Scope and Impact of Services Outsourcing,
1-22 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. Working Paper No. 05-9, 2005), available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/wp05-9.pdf. See, also, Alan S. Blinder, How Many 
U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshoreable?, 1-44 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Studies, Working Paper No. 
142, 2007), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/142blinder.pdf.    
122 Blinder, supra note 121, at 33 (finding a weak direct correlation between 
“offshoreability” of occupations and the level of higher educational attainment they 
require). 
123 Id. at 2. 
124 David H. Autor, Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent 
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration 1-45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8337, 2000), available at
http://web.mit.edu/flevy/www/skillcontent.pdf. 
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and education spectra.125  In fact, employers may have an enhanced 
financial incentive to automate or ship high-paying jobs overseas.126  The 
implications of these trends on the educational investment are captured by 
Krugman: “It’s no longer true that having a college degree guarantees that 
you’ll get a good job, and it’s becoming less true with each passing 
decade.”127  It should be noted that Krugman is not arguing against 
education; he is arguing that education no longer provides a sure route to 
the middle-class.   
When assessing the wisdom of any investment, it is important that 
costs and potential payoff be considered together.  Researchers have 
estimated that the “break even” point for bachelor’s degree holders occurs 
at about the age of 33.128  Based on this estimate, the typical worker with a 
bachelor’s degree has ample time to realize a profit on his educational 
investment.129  However, a few trends render this estimate less reflective of 
today’s reality.  Many students are attending college later in life,130 thereby 
reducing the amount of time they are able to profit from their educational 
investment.  Also, many students are taking longer to complete their 
studies,131 a proverbial “double-whammy” that not only reduces the amount 
of time they are able to profit, but also increases the amount of time 
necessary to profit.132  In addition, education costs have continued to greatly 
125 Blinder, supra note 121, at 32. 
126 Martin Ford, Can a Computer Do a Lawyer's Job?, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 15 2011, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/02/can-a-computer-do-a-
lawyers-job/71238/. 
127 Krugman, supra note 120. See also id. (arguing that strengthening labor unions and 
providing universal health care are more effective means of fostering prosperity than 
education).  
128 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7. 
129 The educational investment (i.e. costs) consists not only of direct expenses, such as 
tuition, but also opportunity costs, mainly in the form of lost income. See, e.g., id. at 4.   
130 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADULT LEARNERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BARRIERS TO 
SUCCESS AND STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE RESULTS 3 (2007), 
http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_Documents/Adult%20Learners%20in%20Higher%
20Education1.pdf. 
131 JOHN BRIDGELAND ET AL., CIVIC ENTERPRISES, ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE 13 (2011), 
available at http://www.civicenterprises.net/reports/across_the_great_divide.pdf (“[F]rom 
1968 to 2007 the college completion rate remained relatively constant while time- to-
degree increased.”).
132 Increased time in school is associated with higher education costs. See, e.g., Nate 
Johnson, Complete College America, Three Policies to Reduce Time to Degree 1 (2011), 
available at 
http://www.completecollege.org/docs/Three%20Policies%20to%20Reduce%20Time%20to
%20Degree%20-%20Nate%20Johnson.pdf.  But cf., BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 13 
(acknowledging that 43-53% of students work while enrolled and these earnings reduce 
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outpace inflation,133 further amplifying salary stagnation and extending the 
break-even point.   
But even with these trends, most researchers still agree that higher 
levels of education remain superior to lower levels in terms of investment 
payoff—at least generally.  So instead of “Education pays”, a more 
appropriate tagline might be “Education can pay”, based largely on the type 
of degree earned and the amount of time and money expended. 
Irrespective of the risks, college participation continues to increase 
and, along with increased education costs, has hastened the prominence of 
another form of risk into the educational investment equation: student loans.
III. STUDENT LOANS AS “ENLIGHTENED SOCIAL POLICY”
Education access has been an “enlightened social policy”134 of the 
federal government for more than a half century.135  The federal 
government’s role in student financial aid was instigated in large part by 
race-based and class-based college enrollment gaps.136  Policymakers 
reasoned that financial aid would be an effective means of spurring 
educational investments by members of underrepresented groups.  The idea 
of public investments in what is essentially a private (or individual) 
endeavor has been justified based on the public benefits of an educated 
populace and the public burdens of under-investments in education.137  The 
education costs by reducing opportunity costs). 
133 See, e.g., FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID:
STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-15 iii (2010), 
http://federalstudentaid.ed.gov/static/gw/docs/FiveYearPlan_2011.pdf [hereinafter FSA 
STRATEGIC PLAN] (“The average cost of postsecondary education has been rising far faster 
than inflation, increasing the financial pressures on students and their families.”). 
134 The Brunner court termed the federal government’s efforts to make student loans 
accessible to students who would not qualify for loans in the private market “enlightened 
social policy”.  The policy objective was education access.  In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 
135 The Higher Education Act of 1965 is said to have represented the first sign of a federal 
commitment to access in higher education.  See, e.g., Lawrence E. Gladieux & Jacqueline 
E. King, The Federal Government and Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUATION 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 151 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds,,1999). 
136 See, e.g., SANDRA R. BAUM, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, FINANCIAL AIS TO 
LOW-INCOME COLLEGE STUDENTS: ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS 5 (1987), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED377265.pdf (“The changed social attitude toward poverty 
and society’s responsibility for economic conditions had created concern over the 
imbalance in college attendance by race and family income.”). 
137 CONG, BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S., A CBO STUDY: COSTS AND POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS 13 (2010), availabl at 
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titans of the federal student aid policy are Pell grants and student loans.    
A. Pell Grant 
The Pell Grant Program was created by legislation in 1972 and is the 
hallmark higher education need-based grant program.138  The program is 
behemoth, with more than nine million recipients splitting grants totaling 
$30 billion during the 2010-2011 school year.139  Very generally, Pell 
eligibility is determined by the difference between a student’s cost of 
attendance and her Expected Family Contribution (EFC).140  Any difference 
between the cost of attendance and EFC is covered by a Pell grant up to the 
Congressionally-stipulated maximum for that school year ($5,550 for 2011-
2012).141  For example, a student with a cost of attendance equaling or 
exceeding the maximum Pell grant and an EFC of $0 will receive the 
maximum award.  Students do not have to repay these grants, except under 
very limited circumstances.142  The rapid growth of the program143 has 
become a source of concern, if not consternation.144  Ironically, even though 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/110xx/doc11043/03-25-StudentLoans.pdf [hereinafter CBO 
Study] (“The benefits of subsidizing education may also outweigh the costs when 
education produces benefits for society in addition to the private benefits enjoyed by the 
student.  Students may fail to take those social benefits into account when making choices 
about their education, which provides a case for government subsidization.”).
138 See, e.g., THOMAS J. KANE, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING HOW AMERICANS 
PAY FOR COLLEGE (1999). 
139 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2009-2010 FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM END-OF-YEAR 
REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2009-
10/pell-eoy-09-10.pdf.  
140 The Expected Family Contribution (EFC) is a formula computed using information 
provided by a student in her Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).  The EFC 
is used to compute eligibility for various forms of student aid. FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., YOUR FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: LEARN THE BASICS AND MANAGE 
YOUR DEBT 39 (2010) [hereinafter MANAGE YOUR DEBT], available at 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/11-12YFSL.pdf.  See generally,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PELL GRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST P-3 
(2010) [hereinafter PELL BUDGET REQUEST], available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget11/justifications/p-pell.pdf (explaining 
how EFC is calculated). 
141 PELL BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 140, at p-3. 
142 A student may have to repay a Pell grant in some cases when she withdraws from 
school. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 4.  
143 In the last decade, Pell expenditures have increased from about $8 billion to about $30 
billion.  In the past three years alone, expenditures have doubled, with most of that 
increased coming over the last year.  The number of grant recipients has increased 46% 
over the last three years.  PELL BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 140, at Table 1. 
144 See, e.g., Richard Vedder, Pell-Mell, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 17, 2011, available 
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costs associated with the program continue to skyrocket, the “buying 
power” of the grants continues to decline.145
B. Student Loans 
Federal student loans were first authorized in 1958 as part of the 
National Defense Education Act.146  The initial program was extremely 
limited compared to the system we have today.  Roughly $300 million was 
appropriated over four years for institutions to disburse as interest-
subsidized loans to undergraduate students with financial need.147  During 
the 1980s, student loans became the centerpiece of federal student aid 
efforts.  By 1985, student loans had grown to 50% of the federal aid 
students received.148  In the time period spanning 2006-2012, federal 
student loan volume more than doubled.149  The volume has increased 
almost 400% since 1999.150  Since 2006, the number of students receiving 
federal student loans has almost doubled—now totaling more than 25 
million.151  And unsurprisingly, total outstanding federal student loan debt 
at http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/pell-mell/28873 (proposing various reforms to 
Pell program to reduce costs and increase “bang for our buck”).
145 The maximum Pell grant ($5,550 for 2011-2012) covers 32% of the in-state cost of 
attending a public, 4-year college or university, down from 44% a decade earlier.  The 
buying power at private, 4-year colleges and universities has fallen from 17% in 1992 to 
14% in 2012. COLLEGE BOARD TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: TRENDS IN STUDENT AID
2011 (2011) [hereinafter TRENDS IN STUDENT AID], available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/Student_Aid_2011.pdf. 
146 Statement of Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Cong. Budget Office: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Comm. on Education and Labor 3 (1979) 
[hreinafter CBO Hearing], http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/52xx/doc5223/doc20.pdf.   
147 The original law set the program length at 8 years.  For every $9 in loan funds received 
from the government, schools were required to add $1.  Interest was set at 3%, essentially 
the “cost of money”. Id.
148 BAUM, supra note 136, at 41. 
149 For FY2006, total new volume through the Federal Family Education Loan Program 
and the Federal Direct Student Loan Program was $58,864,000,000.  In FY2012, volume 
was $124,318,000,000. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 
2012 BUDGET REQUEST S-13 (2012) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST], 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/s-loansoverview.pdf.  
150 For FY1999, new student loan volume was $33,712,385,207. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
FEDERAL STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS - LOAN VOLUME UPDATES
(10/29/10) [hereinafter LOAN VOLUME UPDATES], available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/opeloanvol.html (click on appropriate year 
for spreadsheet listing data). 
151 For FY2006, the total number of federal loan recipients was 13,667,000.  For FY2012, 
recipients totaled 25,124,000.  FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 148, at S-
13.  See, also, LOAN VOLUME UPDATES, supra note 149 (listing the number of FY1999 
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has increased more than 540% since 2000, now totaling $807 billion.152
There are three types of federal student loans: Stafford, Direct 
PLUS, and Perkins.153  By far, the largest of the three is the Stafford loan 
program, accounting for 80% of new loan volume.154  Stafford loans come 
in two forms: subsidized and unsubsidized.155  The interest on subsidized 
loans is paid by the government while the student is enrolled in school at 
least half-time and for a six month “grace period” thereafter; interest 
accrues on unsubsidized loans from the point they are disbursed.156  A 
student can qualify for both forms of Stafford loans (up to applicable 
maximums), with the subsidized amount being based on financial need.157
Direct PLUS loans are available to graduate and professional school 
students and parents of dependent students.158  The purpose of PLUS loans 
is to account for the difference between a student’s cost of attendance and 
any other aid the student has received, including scholarships, grants, and 
other loans.159  Interest accrues on PLUS loans from the point they are 
disbursed.160 In addition, borrowers must pass a nominal check of “adverse 
credit history”.161  Perkins loan eligibility is based on financial need.  The 
program is funded by a combination of federal and institutional funds; only 
about 1,800 of the 2,900 institutions eligible to receive federal financial aid 
funds participate.162
Most of these loans have to be repaid; however, the government 
subsidizes loans mainly by offering them at lower interest rates than are 
available in the private market and by tolling the accrual of interest for 
certain students.163  Most federal student loans are offered without regard to 
federal loan recipients was 8,766,922). 
152 CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at Summary (listing the outstanding debt as $149 billion 
in 2000).  See, also, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 149, at S-20, 21 
(listing outstanding debt figures for FY 2012).  
153 MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 5. 
154 CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at 1. 






161 Id. See generally, Federal Direct Parent Plus Loan Information, Office of Student 
Financial Aid, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, http://sfa.osu.edu/forms/award/plus.pdf (last 
visited May 12, 2012) (listing grounds for PLUS loan denial as loan delinquencies, 
“bankruptcy discharge, foreclosure, repossession, tax lien, wage-garnishment, or write-off 
of Title IV debt during the last 5 years”).
162 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PERKINS LOAN PROGRAM (2009), 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpl/index.html. 
163 See, e.g., CBO PAPER, supra note 103. 
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credit rating.164  So the subsidies are greatest for individuals with bad credit, 
as private lenders would likely impose higher interest rates.165  Moreover, 
the subsidies serve the access goal mainly by providing a source of funds to 
many individuals who would not qualify for private loans at all.166
Even though federal student loans were introduced in a climate of 
“ideological and philosophical objections…to helping students by making 
debtors out of them”,167 the programs’ scope and size have been continually 
broadened, even against early Presidential objections.168 Today, with 
outstanding student loan debt expected to soon top $1 trillion, surpassing 
credit card debt,169 popular discussion of student loans is often captured in 
ominous headlines warning of “bubbles” bursting and other financial 
mayhem.170  So it seems that the ideological and philosophical differences 
of yore are taking on new prominence as student loan debt reaches 
uncharted levels.  But like all forms of debt, student loans are a reflection of 
larger trends, and the rise in student loan debt can be attributed to increased 
college participation and increased education costs.171
C. Increased College Participation 
Higher education has experienced explosive growth over the last 40 
years.  Between 1970 and 2009, enrollment in degree-granting institutions 
more than doubled, from 7.4 million to 17.6 million.172  This growth is 
likely to continue, as projections indicate that 19.6 million students will be 
pursuing college degrees in 2020.173  Increases in college-going rates among 
164 See, e.g., MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 8. 
165 CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at 10 (“[T]he government furnishes a subsidy…whenever 
it accepts terms on the financing it provides that are more favorable than the terms that 
participants in private markets would demand to take on comparable obligations and 
risks.”).  
166 Id. at 24 (“[S]ome evidence suggests that federal policy has been effective at easing 
[credit] constraints for most students.”).
167 Id. at 1. 
168 CBO Hearing, supra note 146, at 3 (remarking in 1979 that Congress continued to 
reauthorize and generously fund student loan programs over the objections of “every  
president since President Eisenhower”). 
169 Tamar Levin, Burden of College Loans on Graduates Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/education/12college.html?_r=4&hp.  
170 See, e.g., Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans an Impending Bubble? Is Higher Education a 
Scam?, BUSINESS INSIDER, May 2, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/are-
student-loans-an-impending-bubble-is-higher-education-a-scam-2011-5#ixzz1NW0MVtet. 
171 See, e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 137. 
172AUD ET. AL.., supra note 45, at 34. 
173 Id. 
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both “traditional” and “non-traditional” students have fueled the growth.174
In 2009, 52% of 20-21 year olds were enrolled in college, up from 32% in 
1970.175  Similarly, 14% of individuals age 25-29, a non-traditional age 
range, were enrolled in college in 2009, up from 8% in 1970.176  Enrollment 
increases have been spread across all sectors of higher education.  Between 
2000 and 2009, undergraduate enrollments at public, private, and for-profit 
institutions increased 27%, 17% and 400% respectively.177  Post-
baccalaureate enrollments have increased as well, rising from 1.6 million in 
1983 to 2.9 million in 2009.178  All of these increases are projected to 
persist at various levels through 2020.179
D. Increased College Costs 
College costs of attendance have been on a steady rise for over 30 
years.  The average published in-state tuition and fees for a 4-year public 
college or university was $8,244 in 2011-2012—an increase of 8% over the 
previous school year.180  Public out-of-state tuition and fees increased 6% in 
2011-2012, to $20,770.181  Tuition and fees at community colleges 
increased 9%, to $2,963.182  Private 4-year colleges and universities saw an 
increase of 4.5% in 2011-2012, to $28,500.183  The average among for-
profit institutions increased 3%, to $14,487.184
The annual increases in college costs have outpaced inflation.  The 
decade from 2000 to 2009 saw yearly increases in education costs of 6.5% 
per year at public 4-year institutions, 5.6% at private 4-year schools, and 
174 FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 7 (defining traditional students as those who 
“go to college directly after high school” and non-traditional students as “those who are 25 
years old and above”).
175 AUD ET. AL.. supra note 45, at 138. 
176 Id. 
177 Public enrollments increased from 10.5 to 13.4 million; private enrollments increased 
from 2.2 to 2.6 million; for-profit enrollments increased from 400,000 to 1.6 million. Id. at 
34. 
178 Id. at 36. 
179 Id. (“Fall enrollment in postbaccalaureate programs is projected to increase through 
2020 to 3.4 million students.”).
180 COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY & POLICY CENTER, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011
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5.3% at community colleges.185  Since 2006, costs at for-profit schools have 
increased 7.6% per year.  Inflation during this period was about 2.5% per 
year.186
The rise in educations costs is showing no signs of abating, with 
further increases projected through 2015.187  If these increases continue at 
the same rates, the costs of attending college in 2015 will be more than 
double the costs in 2000.188  It is important to point out that not all students 
pay the published tuition rate.  After various forms of aid are applied, many, 
if not most, students pay much less.  But even net prices are higher today 
than they were in 2000.189
Increases in college costs have played out in the context of stagnant 
and declining wages.  And while the cited reasons for the increases vary,190
the consensus seems to be that the increases are unsustainable.191  Families 
are already responding strongly to the increased costs.  The Gallup survey 
found that 63% of families disqualified schools based on costs; this was 7% 
higher than the previous year.192  Additionally, tuition increases were the 
greatest worry among white, black and Hispanic parents.193 “Extreme” 
worry about the economics of attending college increased as income-level 
decreased.194  This finding, while intuitive, is a little ironic, given that 
poorer students tend to pay lower net prices for college.  The finding is also 
troubling, given that negative perceptions of costs can depress enrollments 
rates among groups that are already underrepresented in college.195
185 FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 5. See generally, AUD ET. AL., supra note 45, 
at 132 (explaining that total cost of attendance “includes tuition and fees, books and 
materials, and an allowance for living expenses.”). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 6. 
188 Id. 
189 AUD ET. AL.. supra note 45, at 128 (“For low-income, middle-income and high-income 
families, the net price increased, respectively by $1,400, $2,200, and $3,600.”).
190 Taylor, supra note 26, at 749 (explaining that declining state funding for higher 
education has prompted schools to raise revenue through tuition increases).  See also, Dill, 
supra note 18, at 143 (citing theory that asserts increased competition among institutions 
for prestige has engendered tuition increases). 
191 See, e.g., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 180, at 9. 
192 GALLUP, supra note 104, at 43. 
193 Concern about tuition increases exceeded those related to things like joblessness and 
decreases in savings, investments, and home values.  Id. at 54. 
194 Id. (“More respondents from households with annual incomes of less than $35,000 were 
extremely worried about all of the economic factors while many fewer families with 
incomes of $150,000 or more reported being extremely worried.”)
195 See, e.g., BURDMAN, supra note 17. 
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E. Increased Loan Reliance 
Increases in student loan interest rates were the second biggest 
worry among white, black and Hispanic parents.196 The parents’ concern 
makes sense, given the extent to which their children will likely rely on 
student loans to pay for college.  The recession brought about a decline in 
the availability of non-federal college funding sources.197  This declination 
has coincided with a rise in student loan borrowing.  During the 2008-2009 
school year, 56% of full-time undergraduate students utilized students 
loans;198 this was up from 45% during 1999-2000.199 The average loan from 
all sources, including private loans, was $8,200 in 2007-2008 compared to 
an inflation-adjusted $6,500 in 1999-2000.200
1. Degree Type 
Comparing graduates who received their degrees in 2008 to those 
who did so in 1996 illustrates a startling trend: bachelor’s degree recipients 
who graduated in 2008 with debt borrowed $23,287, compared to $17,075 
among 1996 graduates—a 36% increase; those who graduated with 
associate’s degrees with debt borrowed $13,321 in 2008, compared to 
$7,751 in 1996—a 72% increase; certificate program graduates with debt 
borrowed $11,427 in 2008, compared to $7,300 in 1996—a 57% 
increase.201  In addition, the percentage of graduates with more than 
$15,000 in debt increased more than 50% between 1996 and 2008.202
About 17% of all bachelor’s degree graduates had debt of $30,500 or 
196 GALLUP, supra note 104, at 53. 
197 Not only did the recession decrease family, institutional, and state funding sources, it 
also led to a decline in the availability of private student loans.  The latter effect has led to 
increased reliance on federal student loans.  Federal loans offer much more favorable 
repayment terms than private loans, including subsidized interest rates, multiple repayment 
options, hardship deferments and forbearances, and no credit check.  See, e.g., MANAGE 
YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 6. 
198 AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 132.  See also, Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 
75 Fed. Reg. 142, at 101 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668) 
[hereinafter Program Integrity] (stating that at four-year institutions, more than half of full-
time students make use of student loans, compared to about 17% twenty years ago). 
199 AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 126.  
200 Id. 
201 REBECCA HINZE-FIFER & RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF 
COLLEGE STUDENT BORROWING 5 (2010), available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/social-trends-2010-student-borrowing.pdf. 
202 Id. at 8. 
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more—a threshold that is considered “high-debt”.203
2. Institution Type 
Borrowing rates vary among different types of institutions, but they 
have increased across all of them.204  Half of 2008 graduates of public 
colleges and universities had student loan debt, compared to 46% in 
1996.205  Among private institution graduates, borrowing rates increased 
from 59% in 1996 to 72% in 2008.206  The largest increase, however, was in 
the for-profit sector.  Ninety-five percent of 2008 graduates borrowed 
money for school, compared to 77% in 1996.207  Debt loads increased 
across all institution types as well.  Debt among graduates from public 
institutions who borrowed increased almost 29%, from $15,599 among 
1996 graduates to $20,087 among 2008 graduates.208  Private school 
graduates saw their debt increase 41%, $19,852 in 1996 and $28,039 in 
2008.209  During a shorter timeframe, 2004-2008, graduates with debt from 
for-profit schools saw their debt increase about 10%, from $30,106 in 2004 
to $33,046 in 2008.210
3. Socioeconomic Level and Race 
Even though low-income students tend to pay lower net tuition, they 
rely on student loans more heavily than other students.  The typical low-
income student relied on loans to pay about 18% of the total cost of 
attending college; middle-income and high income students relied on loans 
for 15% and 7% respectively.211  There is a racial component to these 
income-based borrowing trends, particularly as they relate to black students.  
Black students disproportionately come from low-income households,212
203 SANDY BAUM & PATRICIA STEELE, COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY AND POLICY CENTER,
WHO BORROWS MOST? BACHELOR’S DEGREE RECIPIENTS WITH HIGH LEVELS OF STUDENT 
DEBT 10 (2010), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/trends/trends-
who-borrows-most-brief.pdf. 
204 AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 128 (“When adjusted for inflation to 2009–10 dollars, the 
average amount borrowed by students at each of the six major combinations of institution 
level and control was higher in 2007–08 than in 1999–2000.”). 
205 HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 202, at 3. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 8. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 GALLUP, supra note 104, at 18. 
212 A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 919, 935 
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and this trend contributes to disproportionately high debt levels.213  Income 
levels, however, do not fully explain the higher debt among black 
students;214 institution choice plays a role as well.  Seventeen percent of 
black students attend for-profit institutions, which is almost double the next 
highest proportion for other racial/ethnic groups.215  Students at for-profit 
schools have the highest borrowing rates and debt in higher education.216
Additionally, students at for-profit institutions are more likely to be 
classified as “independent”217 for financial aid purposes, and thus able to 
borrow more money and accumulate more debt.218  Almost a quarter of 
2008 graduates who were independent students are at or above the high-
debt threshold of $30,500.219  Based on enrollment and borrowing trends, 
black students likely make up a disproportionately high proportion of this 
group. 
High student loan debt would not be a problem if all borrowers 
completed their academic or training programs and got jobs that paid 
sufficiently high wages.  In fact, under that ideal scenario, the concept of 
“high debt” would not even exist.  Alas, we do not live in Utopia, and there 
are many people facing high student loan debt, low (or no) wages, and 
unfulfilled college aspirations.  When the latter takes the form of failure to 
complete an academic or training program, it becomes particularly crippling 
to realize a return on the educational investment.  Failure to complete an 
academic program is a strong predictor of student loan default.220  And 
unfortunately, failure to complete is an all-too-common outcome in U.S. 
higher education.   
(2006). 
213  BAUM & STEELE, supra note 203, at 6 (“High debt levels are more prevalent among 
black bachelor’s degree recipients than among those from other racial/ethnic groups… 
Twenty-seven percent of 2007-08 black bachelor’s degree recipients borrowed $30,500 or 
more, compared to 16% of whites, 14% of Hispanics/Latinos, and 9% of Asians.”). 
214 Id. 
215 Other proportions are as follows: Hispanic: 10.1%, American Indian/Alaska Native: 
9.4%, White: 7.4%, Asian/Pacific Islander: 5.2%. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 273. 
216 See, e.g., HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 201. 
217 According to federal student loan guidelines, an “independent student” is someone who 
is “at least 24 years old, married, a graduate or professional student, a veteran, a member of 
the armed forces, an orphan, a ward of the court, someone with legal dependents other than 
a spouse, an emancipated minor, or is homeless or at risk of homelessness.” MANAGE 
YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 40. 
218 HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 201, at 9. 
219 BAUM & STEELE, supra note 203, at 3. 
220 Program Integrity, supra note 198, at 102. 
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IV. FAILURE TO COMPLETE AS INVESTMENT FAILURE 
Higher education failure is a serious problem.  Long the envy of higher 
education in the world, the U.S. now has the highest failure rate among 
industrialized countries.221  Today, almost half of individuals who begin an 
academic or training program fail to complete.222  This trend is exemplified 
in how the U.S. compares to other countries in terms of educational 
attainment: Among individuals aged 55-64, the U.S. is first in higher 
education attainment; 4th among 35-44 year olds; and 10th among 25-34 
year olds.223  Younger generations are at risk of achieving the dubious 
distinction of being less educated, proportionally, than their parents.224   So 
while noteworthy progress has been made in broadening higher education 
access, completion rates leave much to be desired.  Fortunately, given the 
level of public and private investments in higher education, the predominant 
policy focus is shifting beyond access and beginning to encompass 
completion.  
A. Completion Rates 
Completion rates vary across program and institution type.  Overall, 
57% of students who entered a 4-year academic program in fall 2002 
graduated within 6 years.225  Put the other way, more than 40% of these 
individuals did not complete their programs.  Associate’s degree and 
certificate completion rates are even more dismal.  Only 27% of full-time 
students who entered such programs in fall 2005 graduated within three 
years.226 By institution type, 65% of bachelor’s degree seekers at private 
schools completed their degrees, while only 55% of those at public 
institutions did so—and, worse yet, only 22% of students at for-profit 
schools managed to finish.227
Large disparities in completion exist across racial and ethnic lines.  
221 PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 10. 
222 Id. at 38.  But it is important to note that completion rates are measured in terms of 
specific timeframes, usually 150% of the intended program length, and therefore do not 
account for completion that occurs later.  For example, failure to complete a 4-year 
academic program within 6 years is considered non-completion, even if the student 
completes the degree later.  See, e.g., AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 72.   
223 BRIDGELAND ET AL., supra note 131, at 7. 
224 Id. 
225 AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 72. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
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Among white, black and Hispanic students in 4-year programs, completion 
rates were 60%, 40%, and 49% respectively.228  The highest completion 
rates were among students of Asian/Pacific Islander descent, at 67%; the 
lowest were among Native Americans, at 38%.229  Among white, black and 
Hispanic students in Associate’s or certificate programs, completion rates 
were 29%, 23%, and 26% respectively.230  Asian/Pacific Islanders were the 
only racial/ethnic group with a completion rate above 30%.231
Socioeconomic background characteristics have been found to influence 
completion rates.232  A study of students at flagship public universities 
found that income and parents’ education each influenced graduation 
rates.233  On a whole, students from high-income backgrounds, with 
college-educated parents, were found most likely to graduate from these 
universities.234
The effects of socioeconomic factors on college participation and 
completion are topics of intense inquiry.  The interest is well-placed 
because these factors likely provide much of the context in which disparities 
play out.  Socioeconomic background influences pre-college academic 
preparation,235 college options and choices,236 and ability to pay237 in 
intertwining fashion.  Inadequate academic preparation diminishes college 
participation and completion rates, disproportionately affecting students of 
color and the poor.238  Inadequate academic preparation, along with 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 73. 
231 Id. 
232 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 34 (“High school graduates from low-income 
backgrounds, those whose parents did not go to college, and black and Hispanic students 
have lower college enrollment rates and much lower educational attainment rates than 
others.”).
233 The graduation rate for high-income students was 83%, while the rate for low-income 
students was 70%.  After controlling for various background characteristics (e.g. entrance 
exam scores), parents’ education and income level each contributed to the disparity.  Id. 
234 Id. at 40. 
235 See, e.g., Michael Kirst, Secondary and Postsecondary Linkages, in ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 44 (Stacy Dickert-Conlin.& Ross Rubenstein eds., 
2007). 
236 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID 
GAME: MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 47 
(1998). 
237 Id. at 14 (stating that the failure of student aid to keep pace with rising education costs 
has restricted access of low-income students to higher education). 
238 Kirst, supra note 236, at 44 (discussing factors that lead to subpar pre-college education 
of students of color and the poor). 
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insufficient ability to pay, can often restrict college choices.239  Insufficient 
ability to pay can keep even academically qualified students from 
completing college—or attending at all.240  With all of these factors at play, 
it is easy to imagine how the disadvantages of poverty can compound, 
diminishing an individual’s chances of completing college and resulting in 
the disparities discussed earlier. 
B. Cohort Default Rates 
Short of bankruptcy, cohort default rates are the most direct 
expression of educational investment failure.  Cohort default rates represent 
the percentage of federal student loan defaulters from a particular 
educational institution.241 Calculating a school’s cohort default rate is 
pretty straightforward—in theory, of course.  The Department of Education 
(ED) identifies a cohort by determining the number of former students who 
went into repayment during a particular fiscal year.  ED then determines the 
number of individuals from that cohort who have defaulted on their student 
loans during the “cohort default period” (usually about two years).  The rate 
is then calculated by dividing the number of defaulters by the total number 
of individuals in the cohort.242  A cohort default rate above certain 
thresholds could limit or eliminate a school’s eligibility for federal student 
aid.243  Overall, cohort default rates were 8.8% for fiscal year 2009, up from 
7% in 2008.244  Predictably, cohort default rates vary across institution type.  
239 See, e.g., MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 237, at 47 (observing that “[l]ow-
income students are increasingly rare at four-year colleges and universities” due to 
increased education costs). 
240 Edward P. St. John, The Impact of Financial Aid Guarantees on Enrollment and 
Persistence: Evidence From Research on Indiana’s Twenty-First Century Scholars and 
Washington State Achievers Programs, in STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND 
RACIAL INEQUALITY 125 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2004), available at 
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/meritaid/fullreport04.php (arguing that millions 
of academically prepared, low income students are being denied educational opportunities 
due to financial difficulty). 
241 The Department of Education calculates cohort default rates for every college or 
university that receives federal financial aid funds.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., COHORT 
DEFAULT RATE GUIDE, 2.1-1 (2006) [hereinafter COHORT DEFAULT RATE] 
http://ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/guide/attachments/CDRGuideMasterSept06.pdf. 
242 Id. at 2.1 (providing a detailed explanation of how cohort default rates are calculated, 
including an alternate method for schools with less than 30 student loan borrowers in a 
cohort). 
243 Id. at 2.4-3 (explaining the ramifications of having cohort default rates over 25% and 
40%). 
244 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIRECT LOAN AND FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN 
PROGRAMS, INSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RATE COMPARISON OF FY 2007, 2008, AND 2009
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The fiscal year 2009 rates were 7.2% for public institutions, 4.6% for 
private institutions, and almost 15% for for-profit institutions.245  Default 
rates tend to increase over time, with those at for-profit schools increasing 
at the highest rates among all institution types.246
C. “Gainful Employment” Rules
Other measures of repayment rates are also seen as proxies for 
determining the extent to which an educational program is a good (or bad) 
investment.  The ED has implemented a highly controversial set of rules 
which rely, in part, on repayment rates to determine whether an educational 
program is providing “gainful employment” opportunities for students.247
The concept of gainful employment is rooted in the consumer protection 
functions of the ED.  All programs at for-profit institutions and those lasting 
less than one year at public and private institutions must “prepare students 
for gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”248  Historically, this 
standard has been undefined, and therefore schools have not been required 
to demonstrate compliance in any specific way.249  Repayment rates play a 
central role in defining gainful employment and providing meaningful 
benchmarks for assessing compliance.  For example, one path to 
compliance requires programs to have an aggregate loan repayment rate of 
at least 45%.250  Programs with repayment rates below 35% may be deemed 
ineligible to receive federal financial aid funds.251
As an alternative to the loan repayment benchmarks, the rules also 
COHORT DEFAULT RATES (2011), 
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html.
245 Id.
246 See, e.g., U.S. Gen Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, H. Subcomm. On Higher 
Education, Lifelong Learning and Competitiveness, Proprietary Schools: Stronger 
Department Of Education Oversight Needed to Help Ensure Only Eligible Students 
Receive Federal Student Aid (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf (showing default rates over a 2-, 3-, and 4-year 
periods for various program types). 
247 See, e.g., Goldie Blumenstyk, Despite Criticism, Education Department Moves Ahead 
with 'Gainful Employment' Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 8, 2011, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/Despite-Criticism-Education/127425/. See  generally, Program 
Integrity, supra note 200 (providing detailed presentation of proposed regulations). 
248 Program Integrity, supra note 200, at 112. 
249 Id. at 14. 
250 Id. at 20 (explaining that “[t]he rate would be based on the total amount of loans repaid 
divided by the original outstanding balance of all loans entering repayment in the prior four 
Federal fiscal years”).
251 Id. at 17.  
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provide standards based on debt-to-income thresholds.  Programs for which 
the typical former student has student debt payments that are less than 8% 
of annual earnings and less than 20% of discretionary income are deemed 
compliant with gainful employment standards. 252  On the other hand, 
programs with debt-to-income ratios exceeding 12% of annual earnings or 
30% of discretionary income would become ineligible for federal student 
loan funding if their repayment rate is also below 35%.253
The minimum standards set out by the gainful employment rules are 
policy statements.  The ED is saying that repayment rates below 35% and 
debt-to-income ratios exceeding 12% of annual earnings or 30% of 
discretionary income represent intolerable levels of investment failure.  
According to ED estimates, more than 255,000 students are enrolled in 
programs that would be rendered ineligible under the gainful employment 
rules.254  In other words, more than a quarter million students are at the 
greatest risk of investment failure, typified by high student loan debt and 
difficulty paying it.  The bulk of these students are enrolled in for-profit 
schools,255 and unfortunately these schools are often criticized for 
questionable and inappropriate enrollment practices.256
V. INFORMATION ASSYMETRY AS INVESTMENT FRAUD 
Educational investment decisions are filled with wide-ranging 
uncertainty.  Individuals who decide to invest in education must choose 
among a dizzying array of schools and programs.  Compounding the 
inherent difficulties of this task is a lack of reliable information regarding 
school quality or even programmatic content.257  Worse yet, students are 
often unable to even ascertain the costs of their educational investments 
beforehand, due to “complicated pricing structures”.258  The resulting 
information asymmetry between schools and students contributes to what 
252 Id. at 44. See generally, id. at 35 (describing how loan debt and income are calculated). 
253 Id. at 44. 
254 Calculations by author. Id. at 54. 
255 Of the 3,000 programs that would fall below ineligible thresholds, about 65% would be 
offered by for-profit schools, 30% by public schools, and 5% by private schools.  Id. at 68.  
256 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 26, at 733 (describing the nature of misrepresentations and 
fraud in higher education, particularly in the for-profit sector). 
257 LONG, supra note 16, at 1 (“[W]ith little help families must sort through a complex 
menu of postsecondary institutions that differ in terms of level, sector, and focus as well as 
costs, admissions standards, and credentials and majors offered. Then they must put this 
information in perspective with their own personal situations and preferences.”).
258 Id. 
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can be termed “bounded rationality”—circumstances where a rational 
person makes an irrational decision.259  Irrational educational decisions, 
principally in the form of bad school choices, often lead to education 
investment failure, and when this failure is the result of deception, it is akin 
to investment fraud. 
A. Difficulty Obtaining Information 
Choosing a school is a critical educational investment decision.  
When choosing a school, a student is not only deciding from where she will 
hopefully receive a diploma; she is also deciding the type of program she 
will undertake, which determines the credential she receives and the 
minimum amount of time it will take her to complete the program.  
Additionally, the choice of school can also determine the student’s chance 
of completion; the educational “undermatch” phenomenon is an example of 
this.  Researchers have found that low-income students who enroll in the 
most selective institutions for which they are qualified have a greater 
chance of completing their program than their peers who undermatch.260  If 
more students were aware of the importance of school characteristics, like 
selectivity, and if more students had access to useful information about 
these characteristics, there would probably be less bounded rationality 
among those who choose to invest in higher education. 
The choice of school is often influenced by costs; however, many 
students lack reliable information about education costs and financial aid.  
For example, about 850,000 students who would likely qualify for Pell 
grants do not even bother to apply for them.261  Researchers tend to believe 
this trend results from a lack of information, given the utter irrationality of 
these students—the neediest—not pursuing such a favorable source of 
financial aid.262  Students also lack basic awareness of financial concepts 
that are relevant to determining education costs.  In one study, only 27% of 
respondents could correctly answer basic questions about interest rates, 
inflation, and investment risk diversification.263  Socioeconomic factors 
259 See, e.g., Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 298 (1999), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/JonesBounded1.pdf. 
260 BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 41 (‘“[U]ndermatching’ is defined as having test scores 
and high school grades that would make acceptance at a very selective state university very 
probable, but enrolling instead at a less-selective institution.”).
261 BURDMAN, supra note 17, at 4 (“Surprising numbers of low-income students—850,000 
a year, or 26 percent, according to the American Council on Education— don’t apply for 
federal aid at all, even though they would likely qualify for Pell Grants.”).
262 Id. 
263 The researchers studied financial literacy among a nationally representative sample of 
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influenced knowledge of these concepts.264  All these trends are troubling, 
given research suggesting that knowledge of education costs and financial 
aid options influence college participation, college choice, and, in the end, 
college completion.265
B. Unscrupulous Practices 
A particularly insidious manifestation of the information asymmetry 
is deception and fraud.  Some colleges, particularly those in the for-profit 
sector, have been found to engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices in 
order to encourage enrollment and, in the process, secure federal financial 
aid funds.266  This deception is most often targeted at individuals who are 
most likely to be duped by it.267
In 2010, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
23-28 year olds.  The researchers posed three questions of basic financial literacy, testing 
knowledge of interest rates, inflation, and investment risk diversification: 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 
5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to 
grow: more than $102, exactly $102, or less than $102? {Do not know; refuse to 
answer} 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation 
was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same 
as, or less than today with the money in this account? {Do not know; refuse to answer} 
Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company 
stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” {Do not know; refuse 
to answer} 
Only 27% of respondents answered all three questions correctly, with 79% answering the 
interest rate question correctly, 54% answering the inflation question correctly, and 47% 
answering the investment risk diversification question correctly. ANNAMARIA LUSARDI ET 
AL., FINANCIALLY LITERATE AMONG THE YOUNG: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CONSUMER POLICY (2010), 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~alusardi/Papers/Financial_literacy_young.pdf.  
264 Id. at 12. 
265 See, e.g., id. at 8. 
266 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED 
IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES (2010) [hereinafter GAO 
UNDERCOVER TESTING], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf.  
267 Taylor, supra note 26, at 761 (asserting that “the most common targets of proprietary 
school advertisements are poor, undereducated, and older” and thus “highly susceptible to 
being persuaded by misrepresentations, due to their lack of insight about higher 
education”).
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undercover investigation of 15 for-profit schools found deceptive, if not 
fraudulent, enrollment practices at all of them.268  The deception related to 
graduation rates, costs, and post-employment employment prospects and 
salary—factors that are highly relevant to anyone attempting to determine 
the prudence of an educational investment.269   For example, representatives 
at two colleges guaranteed employment upon graduation and 
representatives at five colleges inflated salaries.270  Additionally, at nine 
colleges, undercover investigators were given deceptive information about 
program duration or costs.271  Representatives at six colleges deceptively 
told investigators that they were required to enroll prior to receiving 
information about financial aid eligibility.272  Representatives at four 
colleges encouraged investigators to falsify financial aid documents.273  One 
representative even told an undercover investigator that “student loans were 
not like car loans because ‘no one will come after you if you don’t pay.’”274
This investigation highlighted the pervasive nature of deception and fraud 
in higher education, as well as the informational disadvantage at which 
students often find themselves.   
For schools, there are few disincentives to engage in deceptive or 
fraudulent behavior when enrolling students.  The maximum fine imposed 
by the ED for a “substantial” misrepresentation is only $25,000, 275 a 
nominal amount in the grand scheme of things.  ED can strip a school of its 
federal financial aid eligibility, but is reluctant to pursue such sanctions, 
even when appropriate.276  Making matters worse, another GAO study 
found the ED’s methods of detecting some forms of noncompliance with 
financial aid rules to be inadequate.277  In addition, Federal Student Aid 
(FSA), the division within ED that oversees federal student aid programs, 
268 GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 266, at 7. 
269 Id. at 9. 
270 Id. at 10. 
271 Id. at 11. 
272 Id. 
273 The representatives’ encouragement of this fraud was inexplicable, given that the 
investigators presented an ability to pay for the programs without financial aid. Id. at 7. 
274 Id. at 12. 
275 GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 266, at 6. 
276 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-10, HIGHER EDUCATION: STRONGER 
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO ENFORCE BAN ON INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO SCHOOL 
RECRUITERS 33 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1110.pdf (“Education 
officials also noted that they have not terminated a school for incentive compensation 
issues. They were primarily concerned that schools would challenge terminations and 
Education would need to invest resources in litigating cases without necessarily prevailing 
in those terminations.”).
277 See, e.g., id. at 2. 
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lists as a strategic priority the development of “compliance metrics” for 
identifying schools that engage in deceptive or fraudulent behavior;278 the 
implication being that current measures are inadequate. 
1. Few Avenues for Redress 
Schools that engage in deceptive or fraudulent practices are 
protected by the courts, mainly though the doctrine of academic 
abstention—a judicial “reluctance to intrude upon the inner workings of 
[higher education] institutions.”279  The doctrine is a historical relic, tracing 
its existence to a time when colleges were operated almost exclusively by 
churches.280 Courts were reluctant to intrude upon the inner workings of the 
church, and this reluctance extended to schools, as arms of the church.281
The doctrine, however, has persisted through the advent of public colleges 
and universities and the secularization of most private schools.  The primary 
modern justification is premised on a judicially-held view that courtroom 
fact-finders are unqualified to question the judgments of professional 
educators.282
Adherence to academic abstention disadvantages victims of higher 
education deception and fraud who seek redress in the courts.  Causes of 
action tend to be based on tort or contract law theories.  In tort law, 
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and educational 
malpractice are some of the most common theories of recovery.  In contract 
law, breach of contract is probably the most common theory.  In each, 
judicial reluctance or deference renders each theory ineffective at garnering 
recovery for most plaintiffs.   
Fraudulent misrepresentation is difficult to prove because scienter, 
or intent to deceive, is difficult to prove.  Typically, courts require high 
levels of specificity when considering whether a misrepresentation is 
fraudulent.283  Negligent misrepresentation is rendered mostly ineffective 
because “courts are reluctant to impose a duty of care upon educational 
278 FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 21. 
279 Taylor, supra note 26, at 763. 
280 Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational 
Liability Claims, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 1768, 1812 (1995). 
281 Id. 
282 Taylor, supra note 26, at 763. 
283 See, e.g., Schwitters v. Des Moines Commercial Coll., 203 N.W. 265, 265 (Iowa 1925) 
(characterizing representations made regarding the timeline for course completion and 
post-graduation job acquisition as “no more than a prophecy” and thus not actionable as a 
basis of recovery). 
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institutions for their student outcomes.”284  Courts have cited the 
collaborative nature of education in reasoning that there is no objective 
standard of care that could be imposed upon schools.285  Courts have 
rendered educational malpractice, another negligence-based theory, 
effectively moot based on a host of considerations, including “inherent 
uncertainties” about the causes of the harms being alleged and the potential 
for a flood of litigation that could “overburden schools”.286  Montana is the 
only state where an educational malpractice claim has been allowed to 
proceed.287
Courts require that breach of contract claims allege that specific 
promises were broken,288 thus leaving effectively no path to recovery for 
plaintiffs who were duped by “legally vague, but practically convincing” 
promises.289  And with a seeming nod to academic abstention, one court 
articulated a standard that only those contract claims that allow the court to 
make “an objective assessment” of whether the institution broke a promise 
can stand; those that require the fact-finder to consider “educational 
processes and theories” must be dismissed.290
The information asymmetry that characterizes the relationship 
between schools and students fosters bad educational choices and aids 
unscrupulous schools in deception and fraud.  Both trends contribute to 
investment failure, in the form of failure to complete.  Unfortunately, 
students who are victimized by lack of information or deceptive 
misinformation are offered few options for redress.  And when these 
students leave school with crushing student loan debt, bankruptcy 
represents only an inconsistent source of possible relief.   
VI. BANKRUPTCY AS INCONSISTENT RELIEF 
Currently, student loans are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, unless 
the debtor can prove that paying the debt would be an undue hardship upon 
284 Taylor, supra note 26, at 765. 
285 See, e.g., Tolman v. CenCor Career Coll., 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. App. 1992). 
286 The other cited reasons for declining to recognize educational malpractice are familiar: 
lack of a standard of care and a reluctance to “embroil the courts into overseeing the day-
to-day operations of schools.” Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992). 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 416-17. 
289 Taylor, supra note 26, at 767. 
290 See Ross, 957 F.2d  at 417. 
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him and his dependents.291  Until the mid-1970s, however, student loans 
were dischargeable like other forms of unsecured debt.292  The impetus 
behind restricting student loan discharges was the image of an “about-to-be 
wealthy graduate of medical school or law school” filing for bankruptcy 
before attempting to make any student loan payments.293  These stories 
fostered a perception that the federal student loan program was a 
boondoggle of sorts, with crafty students benefitting at the literal expense of 
the taxpayers.  The overall increase in bankruptcies likely fueled these 
perceptions.   
In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws in large part to study the causes of what the Commission termed “The 
Rising Tide of Consumer Bankruptcies”.294  The Commission studied 
allegations of abuse of student loan discharges and found only limited, 
mainly anecdotal, evidence of such abuse.295  It nonetheless found the abuse 
“reprehensible” and concluded that “it poses a threat to the continuance of 
educational loan programs.”296  The Commission then recommended that 
student loans be non-dischargeable during the first five years after entering 
repayment, unless the debtor can prove an undue hardship.297  In 1976, 
Congress implemented the Commission’s recommendation.298  Since then, 
student loan discharge has been increasingly restricted.  In 1988, the five-
year period of non-discharge was extended to seven years.299 In 1998, the 
seven-year period was removed altogether, leaving an undue hardship 
determination as the only path to a student loan discharge.300  Inexplicably, 
Congress has failed to define undue hardship or provide any guidance to 
judges in assessing each debtor’s situation.  This ambiguity fosters 
inconsistency at practically every juncture in the process of seeking a 
student loan discharge.  
291 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006). 
292 COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 207. 
293 Id. at 209. 
294 The Commission was made up of nine individuals appointed by the President of the 
U.S., the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court.  The Commission was charged with studying and proposing reforms to the 
bankruptcy system.  See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at v, 1.
295 See id. at 176.
296 Id. at 176-77. 
297 Id. at 177 (“The Commission, therefore recommends that, in the absence of hardship, 
educational loans be nondischargeable unless the first payment falls due more than five 
years prior to the petition.”).
298 COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 209. 
299 Id. at 212. 
300 Huey, supra note 4, at 101. 
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A. Overview of Bankruptcy 
Debt is vital to the U.S. economy, as such, so is bankruptcy.  The 
relationship between the two is akin to that of an electrical current and a 
circuit breaker.  Essentially, bankruptcy serves as a means of relieving 
pressure created by over-indebtedness.301  This relief system is critical to 
the proper function of an economy centered around consumption.302
The function of debt is to facilitate consumption.  Debt allows for 
the immediate costs of consumption to be shifted to a later time, when 
presumably increased financial resources will allow the debtor to pay those 
costs.303  Student loans illustrate this function in classic fashion.  Students 
use loans to finance their current education consumption in hopes that their 
education will allow them a future salary sufficient to pay off their student 
loans.  Using debt in this manner can be, and often is, prudent.304
When determining the prudency of taking on debt, rational 
consumers attempt to account for future events, both expected and 
unexpected, that may frustrate their ability to repay the debt.305
Unfortunately, not even the most conscientious debtor can predict the future 
with certainty—and not every debtor is conscientious in the first place.  So 
over-indebtedness is inevitable,306 and when the pressures of over-
indebtedness become unmanageable, bankruptcy is the process through 
which a debtor can receive relief.  But in addition to relieving pressure on 
debtors, bankruptcy protects creditors.307  These dual purposes—relieving 
301 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 , at 61 (“[T]he ‘bankruptcy act . . . is designed to be a kind of 
safety valve for the pressures generated by the conflicts which develop where the exchange 
of goods and services takes place through multiple extensions of credit from a number of 
unconnected sources.’”).
302 A. Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 135, 136 (2007) (“Americans are voracious consumers, but meager producers 
and savers.”).
303 BETTI ET AL., STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSUMER INDEBTEDNESS: STATISTICAL 
ASPECTS 1 (2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/fina_serv/cons_directive/fina_serv06_en.pdf. 
304 Id. (“When given the opportunity and in the right circumstances, we can observe that 
many informed consumers successfully use debt to shift expenditure from one period of 
their lives to another.”).
305 Id. (“The rational consumer takes into consideration the possibility of future serious 
illness, unemployment or other potential negative events when he/she makes decisions such 
as borrowing and makes the necessary precautions, such as insurance, to the extent possible 
and appropriate.”)
306 Id. at 2 (“[L]ike indebtedness, over-indebtedness is a natural phenomenon that 
inevitably touches a proportion of the population at any time and in any economic 
circumstances.”).
307 See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 71. 
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debtors and protecting creditors—create “a system born of conflict and 
competing values”.308  Like over-indebtedness in the economy, conflict is 
unavoidable in bankruptcy.309
1. History 
The U.S. system of bankruptcy, with its dual concerns, is rather 
distinct in history.  Early bankruptcy laws originated in Europe and only 
applied to merchants and commercial traders.310  Bankruptcy was an 
involuntary process, primarily concerned with protecting creditors by 
ensuring that the assets of debtors, particularly those deemed to be evading 
debt obligations, were liquidated and distributed fairly.311  Under these early 
laws, there was no discharge of unsatisfied debts,312 and debtors were 
considered criminal “offenders.”313
The first bankruptcy law in the U.S. was promulgated in 1800 and 
was modeled after the laws in Europe.314  However, the Act of 1841 
fundamentally changed bankruptcy law by allowing for a voluntary action 
and making it available to individual and other non-merchant debtors.315
The voluntary action introduced a largely unprecedented cooperative aspect 
to bankruptcy law.316  This cooperative component was rooted in English 
insolvency law, which was premised on providing a process by which an 
“unfortunate debtor” could liquidate his assets among his creditors.317  In 
essence, the 1841 Act provided a means for a debtor, recognizing his 
financial situation, to file bankruptcy on his own terms, rather than at the 
308 COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 78. 
309 Id. (asserting that bankruptcy “must remain unpopular and controversial” in order to 
serve its dual purposes). 
310 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 63 (“[Bankruptcy laws] germinated in the law-merchant of the 
Italian states and elsewhere in continental Europe during the late Middle Ages as a weapon 
against a commercial trader who ‘made bankrupt’ by flight from a mercantile center . . . or 
. . . by concealment of his property.”).
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Abuse 
or Protection? The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 9, 28 (2007) (remarking that bankrupt debtors were often imprisoned and 
fraudulent bankrupt debtors could be put to death).
314 See id. at 11-12. 
315 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 63. 
316 In practice, cooperative bankruptcies were not completely unprecedented prior to the 
1841 Act.  Creditors and debtors would sometimes enter “friendly”, though still
involuntary, bankruptcies.  Id. at 64.
317 Id. at 63. 
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behest of a creditor.  The fundamental goal of bankruptcy—the liquidation 
and apportionment of debtor assets to creditors—did not change; but the 
voluntary nature of the process represented a fundamental “sea change.”318
The Act was short-lived, as Congress repealed it after only thirteen 
months;319 but voluntary bankruptcy became an enduring notion in future 
legislation. 
The Act of 1898 was the first permanent federal bankruptcy law; the 
previous three acts—1800, 1841, and 1867—were all temporary pieces of 
legislation.320 Debate over the bill lasted nine years,321 with debt discharge 
representing a primary sticking-point.322  The law was based in large part on 
a fiercely pro-creditor bill drafted by Senator Jay Torrey; however, pro-
debtor factions were able to influence the final bill in conference, and the 
result has been characterized as “one of the most favorable pro-debtor relief 
measures ever enacted.”323  The paramount form of debtor relief—the 
discharge of debts—was included in the final bill.  In fact, one Senator 
called the discharge provisions “exceedingly liberal.”324
Like voluntary bankruptcy, debt discharge has persisted as a primary 
component of bankruptcy law for more than 100 years.  The enduring 
legacy of debt discharge has been its role as the basis of a central objective 
of bankruptcy—providing a debtor with a “fresh start”.  The premise of the 
fresh start was captured by the Supreme Court in Williams v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.:325 “to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of 
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the 
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”326
In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,327 the Court characterized the idea of a fresh 
start essentially as a means of integrating the bankrupt debtor back into the 
economy as a productive wage-earner.  The Court stated that preserving the 
right of the debtor to exit bankruptcy with “a new opportunity in life and a 
clear field for future effort”328 was “of the utmost importance . . . because it 
318 See Tabb, supra note 313, at 12. 
319 Bradley Hansen, Bankruptcy Law in the United States, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 
14, 2001) http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/hansen.bankruptcy.law.us.  
320 Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of 
Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 344, 363 (1999) 
(describing the bill’s permanency as “a radical idea at the time”).
321 Id. at 354. 
322 Id. at 368. 
323 Id. at 367. 
324 Id. at 376. 
325 Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915). 
326 Id. at 554-55. 
327 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). 
328 Id. at 244. 
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is a fundamental private necessity [and] a matter of great public concern.”329
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced the 1898 
legislation.330  One of the primary aims of the new Act was to steer 
bankrupt debtors away from filing under Chapter 7 and into Chapter 13.331
The idea behind this encouragement was a belief that creditors would get 
paid more through Chapter 13 payments plans than they were under Chapter 
7 liquidation.332  Unwilling to infringe upon debtor freewill, Congress 
stopped short of compelling certain debtors into Chapter 13; rather it 
provided incentives for such a filing.333  This policy decision demonstrated 
that the voluntary nature of bankruptcy remained a very important ideal.  
However, suspicion remained that some debtors who could afford to pay 
some of their debts through Chapter 13 were nonetheless filing for the 
broader discharge under Chapter 7.  And in 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act334 passed.   
The signature feature of the 2005 Act was a long-held priority of the 
credit industry335—a “means test” that debtors must pass in order to file 
under Chapter 7.336  The means test has been criticized as being sloppily 
written;337 but, very generally, if a debtor’s income is above the applicable 
median income for similar households in his state, he must show that his 
disposable income falls below $100 per month or $6,000 over a five-year 
period.338  While very few debtors are forced into Chapter 13 by the means 
test,339 the fact that Congress was willing to infringe, even a little, upon the 
329 Id. at 245. 
330 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History Of The Bankruptcy Laws In The United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995). 
331 See id. at 35.
332 Id. 
333 Id. (citing “super discharge” of certain debts that would not be dischargeable in Chapter 
7 as an inducement for filing Chapter 13); see also id. at 36 (remarking that Congress 
granted courts the power to dismiss Chapter 7 filings that amounted to “substantial abuse” 
of the system, meaning it was very clear that the debtor could afford to pay some of his 
debts).
334 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
335 COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 90 (noting in 1997 that“[t]he credit industry 
has sought means testing consistently for at least 30 years”).
336 Dickerson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 939.
337 See, e.g., Chelsey W. Tulis, Get Real: Reframing the Debate over How to Calculate 
Projected Disposable Income in § 1325(b), 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 345, 358, 360 (2009) 
(describing how “confusing” language has led to conflicting interpretations of the means 
test). 
338 See Dickerson, supra note 212, at 939 (providing a detailed explanation of the means 
test). 
339 Michelle J. White, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Abuse 
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debtor sanctity of choosing under which Chapter to file is significant. 
Some of the most recent bankruptcy reforms were hastened by 
precipitous increases in the number of bankruptcy filings.  The 1970 
Commission noted that between 1946 and 1967, the total number of 
bankruptcies increased from 10,196 to 208,329, with 191,729 being 
personal bankruptcies.340  The work of this Commission influenced the 
1978 Act.341  A second Commission, formally titled the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission, was established in 1994,342 largely in 
response to the 1.2 million personal bankruptcies that year.  So in the less 
than 30 years between the two Commissions, the number of personal 
bankruptcies increased more than six-fold.  In 2010, there were more than 
1.5 million personal bankruptcies,343 the highest amount since the record 2 
million in 2005.344
As the number of bankruptcies has risen, Congress has excepted an 
increasing number of debt types from discharge.  When a debt is excepted 
from discharge, it survives bankruptcy, and the debtor remains responsible 
for paying it.  Thus, discharge exceptions are direct infringements upon the 
notion of a fresh start.  Pre-1978, discharge was essentially an all-or-nothing 
proposition; the 1978 Act included nine discharge exceptions; the 2005 Act 
includes nineteen.345  Some debts are excepted based on public policy 
reasons; for instance, debt incurred through fraud cannot be discharged.346
Other debts are excepted due to “the inherent nature of the obligation”.347
One such excepted debt is student loans.  The oft-espoused “inherent 
nature” justification is that the viability of the student loan program depends 
or Protection? Economics of Bankruptcy Reform under BAPCPA, 2007 U.ILL. L. REV. 275, 
291 (2007) (calculating that less than 1% of bankrupt debtors were forced into Chapter 13 
because of the means test). See, also, e.g., Christian E. Weller et al., Estimating the Effect 
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on the 
Bankruptcy Rate, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (2010) (noting that while the Chapter 7 filing 
rate decreased after passage of the 2005 Act, this decrease was likely temporary).
340 COMMISSION REPORT1973, supra note 9, at 2. 
341 COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at ii. 
342 Id. at 47. 
343 U.S. BANKRUPTY COURTS—BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS CASES COMMENCED BY 
CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12 MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 
31, 2010 t. F-2 (2011) 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/
1210_f2.pdf. 
344 The number of bankruptcies in 2005 was likely inflated by debtors clamoring to file just 
before the new, more restrictive, bankruptcy laws took effect in October of that year. 
Dickerson, supra note 302, at 148. 
345 Tabb, supra note 330, at 7. 
346 COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 179. 
347 Id. 
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on debtors making good on their obligations.348
B. Undue Hardship Standard 
Bankruptcy courts have struggled with the mere definition of undue 
hardship.  Should the words be construed literally or conceptually?  Should 
the words be defined separately or together?  The In re Heckathorn court 
stated that undue hardship was a “phrase with a particular legal meaning 
and function”.349  Conversely, the In re Skaggs court reasoned that “the 
plain, ordinary meaning” of the words was sufficient in taking a “common 
sense” approach to defining the concept.350
Some courts seem to struggle with determining the extent or degree 
of hardship that should be embedded in their definitions, suggesting that 
“undue” is the more problematic component of the concept.  The In re 
Brunner court stated that “garden-variety” hardships are not “undue.”351
The court suggested that undue hardship required a “certainty of 
hopelessness” about a debtor’s ability to fulfill her payment obligations.352
In contrast, the court in Kopf v. Dep’t of Educ.353 stated that a “certainty of 
hopelessness” standard is antithetical to the fresh start ideal; thus, it applied 
a standard that only required debtors to show a “reasonable” chance that 
paying their loan would force them to live below a “minimal standard of 
living.”354  Frustrated by the ambiguous standards and thresholds applied in 
undue hardship cases, the In re Bryant court tied undue hardship to federal 
poverty guidelines—an objective benchmark.355  According to the court, if a 
debtor’s net income is “at, near or below” the poverty rate or if a debtor’s 
income is above the rate, but she has sufficiently “unique” or 
“extraordinary” expenses, the payments represent an undue hardship.356  So 
the degree of hardship required by courts has ranged from “reasonable” to 
“certain” and has been tied to poverty rates.
Most courts agree that in order for a hardship to be “undue,” it must 
348 See, e.g., In re Claxton, supra note 3, at 568. 
349 In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 194. 
350 In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 867. 
351 In re Brunner, 46 B.R., at 753. 
352 Id. at 755. 
353 245 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) 
354 Id. at 745. 
355 Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 
915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“We feel that such a test will decrease, if not eliminate, the 
resort to the unbridled subjectivity which seems to pervade many of the decisions in [undue 
hardship cases].”).
356 Id. 
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persist into the future.  The Heckathorn court stated that in addition to 
demonstrating current inability to pay, debtors are expected “to show also 
that they cannot reasonably be expected to make payments…in the 
foreseeable future.”357  The In re Coleman court characterized the debtor’s 
threshold burden as proving “that he does not now, and will not in the 
future, have the funds available from which to repay the student loan.”358
However, the Skaggs court, with its plain meaning approach, reasoned that 
current inability to pay, by itself, could represent an undue hardship.359
1. Tests 
Some courts have devised multi-faceted tests essentially to detect an 
undue hardship when considering a debtor’s case.   
a. Brunner 
The most popular test was devised by the Brunner court.360  The 
Brunner test requires debtors seeking a student loan discharge to show the 
following three things:  
1) that the debtor cannot, based on current income and 
expenses, maintain a "minimal" standard of living for 
himself or herself and his or her dependents if forced to 
repay the loans, 2) that this state of affairs is likely to persist 
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the 
student loan, and 3) that the debtor has made good faith 
efforts to repay the loans.361
In essence, the test requires debtors to show that their loan payments 
would require them to sacrifice basic necessities, both presently and for a 
number of years in the future, and that they have made reasonable attempts 
to repay the debt.  The subjectivity and ambiguity are apparent, even in this 
truncated explanation.  What is a “minimal standard of living”? 362  How is 
357 In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 193. 
358 Coleman v. Higher Educ. Assistance Foundation (In re Coleman), 98 B.R. 443, 451 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989). 
359 In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 868. 
360 Nine judicial circuits have adopted the Brunner test. State Univ. New York-Student 
Loan Service Center et al. v. Menezes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65464 (D. Mass. 2006). 
361 In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756. 
362 Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship 
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 197 (2009) (“The doctrine fails to set forth 
even the rough contours of how to engage in a substantive evaluation of income and 
expenses…Instead, the doctrine merely confirms that courts have free rein to infuse 
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inability to pay for “a significant portion of the repayment period” 
predicted?363  What constitutes “good faith efforts”?364  These are all 
questions that remain unclear because undue hardship remains undefined. 
b. Johnson 
Some courts have chosen to adopt the test devised by the In re 
Johnson court.365 Under this test, debtors are required to pass an “undue 
hardship” test that accounts for their current and future sources of income 
and their expenses.366  Debtors must show, given their expenses, their 
income is insufficient to meet their loan obligations.  Their expenses must 
be “reasonable” in order to pass scrutiny.367  Debtors who pass the undue 
hardship test must then pass either a “good faith” test or a “policy” test.  
The Johnson good faith test requires debtors to have made attempts to repay 
the loan; in making this assessment, the test looks at debtor attempts at 
finding employment, minimizing expenses, and maximizing income.368  If a 
debtor fails the good faith test, the court will apply a policy test.  The 
purpose of the policy test is to assess whether granting the discharge would 
represent an abuse of the bankruptcy laws.369  This assessment hinges 
largely on the percentage of the debtor’s total debt that is made up of 
student loans.370  The higher the percentage, the more likely courts will 
view a discharge as abusive.  The test also considers the financial benefit 
the debtor has received from her education.371  Debtors who have received 
little or no benefit are more likely to have their loans discharged.   
In summary, the Johnson test requires debtors to first demonstrate 
that their current income is insufficient to make loan payments and this 
insufficiency will persist.  They must also show that their expenses are 
reasonable.  They must then show either that they have made diligent 
attempts to pay the loans by maximizing income and minimizing expenses 
subjectivity into what should be a straightforward financial calculation.”).
363 Id. at 198 (describing attempts by the Ninth Circuit to apply objective factors to 
determine future inability to pay, but lamenting that a “multifactor test within a multifactor 
test” is not “a realistic way to accomplish consistent results.”).
364 Id. at 200 (“Given the inherent subjectivity in an amorphous standard such as good faith, 
any efforts to clarify its meaning will probably create mischief rather than produce 
clarity.”).
365 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 (D. Pa. 1979) 
366 This test is also referred to as the “mechanical” test. Id. at 35. 
367 Id. at 31. 
368 Id. at 44. 
369 Id. at 52. 
370 Id. at 54. 
371 Id. at 55. 
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or that they have received little financial benefit from their education and 
discharging student loans is not their overwhelming reason for filing 
bankruptcy.  Like Brunner, critical elements of the Johnson test are based 
on ambiguous concepts. 
c. Bryant 
The least popular test is the most objective.  As stated earlier, the In 
re Bryant court attempted to devise an objective test by tying undue 
hardship to net income and poverty benchmarks.  In an effort to minimize 
subjective “moral judgments”, the court assumes pre-bankruptcy good faith 
on the part of debtors.372  But the process of determining net income can be 
knotty when a debtor is claiming unique or extraordinary expenses; 
creditors can challenge the uniqueness or extraordinariness of these 
expenses.373  But of all the tests, the Bryant test makes the most explicit 
effort to base undue hardship determinations on an objective measure.  
d. Totality of the Circumstances 
Some courts eschew reliance on tests altogether.  These courts tend 
to take a “totality of the circumstances” approach to making undue hardship 
determinations.  Recognizing that there was no “universally accepted” test 
of undue hardship,374 the Coleman court stated “rigid adherence…to a 
particular test robs the court of the discretion envisioned by Congress” in 
devising the undue hardship standard.375 The court further stated that “[a]n 
undefined and illusive concept such as ‘undue hardship’ should result from 
a fact-sensitive analysis based on the totality of the circumstances.”376 As a 
result, the court adopted a nine-prong test that assessed the debtor’s revenue 
and expenses; past job history; rate of pay; skills and education; 
maximization of income; prudence of expenses; cause of insolvency; any 
medical problems; and any dependents.377
The Kopf court adopted a three-prong test that assessed a debtor’s 
past, present, and future income; his living expenses; and other relevant 
factors, such as medical problems.  In eschewing the prevailing tests, that 
court reasoned that Johnson and Brunner “[tested] too much”, specifically 
372 In re Bryant, 72 B.R at 918. 
373 Id. at 919. 
374 In re Coleman, 98 B.R. at 448. 
375 Id. at 451. 
376 Id. 
377 Id. 
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good-faith (in the case of both tests) and policy (in the case of Johnson).378
Oddly, Bryant was disregarded not on its merits, but because few other 
courts had adopted it.379  Substantively, the Kopf and Coleman totality 
approaches are very similar; the primary difference is how factors are 
categorized.  In Kopf, “other circumstances” acts as a catchall capturing 
many of the factors that Coleman specifically enumerates.380  The problem 
with both approaches is that they embrace the subjectivity and moral 
judgments that lead to inconsistent undue hardship determinations. 
2. Relief 
The ambiguity of the undue hardship standard has fostered another 
area of inconsistency: undue hardship relief.  Three approaches have 
emerged when determining appropriate relief when undue hardship is 
found: full discharge, partial discharge, and “hybrid” discharge.  
Unfortunately, Congress has failed to provide clarity, and therefore courts 
continue to grapple with this issue. 
a. Full Discharge 
Courts that view undue hardship relief as a full, all-or-nothing, 
proposition typically base their approach on what they view as the plain 
language of the statute.  For example, the Skaggs court reasoned that the 
plain-meaning definition of “debt” in the Bankruptcy Code encompasses the 
entire debt, not some part.381  According to the court, Congress could have 
used language authorizing partial discharge, but chose not to do so,382 and 
“courts are not granted power to remedy perceived defects in legislation.”383
b. Partial Discharge 
Courts that grant partial discharges base their approach on the equity 
function of bankruptcy and their interpretation of Congressional intent.  The 
Heckathorn court emphasized that the bankruptcy process is “embedded in 
equity;”384 as such, courts are allowed, if not required, to grant partial 
378 Kopf, supra note 7, at 741. 
379 Id. at 737. 
380 Examples include medical problems and dependents. Id. at 746. 
381 In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 866. 
382 Id. 
383 Id. at 867. 
384 In re Heckathorn,  199 B.R. at 194. 
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discharges where appropriate.  The court also reasoned that because “[t]he 
words ‘undue hardship’ suggest a matter of degree”, viewing discharge 
from an all-or-nothing perspective would lead to “absurd” results, in light of 
Congress’s goals of providing fresh starts and maximizing student loan 
payments.385  In essence, discharging loans to the extent that they represent 
an undue hardship—and no more—will result in debtors getting the relief 
Congress intended while ensuring that they still pay what they can.   
The Skaggs court characterized the arguments in favor of partial 
discharges thus: Courts that only grant full discharges reward “irresponsible 
debtors who create their own hardship by borrowing excessively and 
unrealistically for their education, while punishing the debtor who has 
borrowed more frugally and for whom, therefore, repayment is not an 
‘undue hardship.’”386  As the arguments goes, all-or-nothing approaches 
incentivize excessive student loan indebtedness.  The Skaggs court 
concluded, however, that such arguments were “better made to Congress 
than to the courts.”387
c. Hybrid Discharge 
The hybrid discharge approach is essentially an amalgamation of the 
full and partial discharge approaches.  Courts that grant hybrid discharge 
agree that the plain-language of the undue hardship standard does not allow 
for partial discharge of aggregate student loan debt.388  But these courts also 
agree that bankruptcy is an equity process and all-or-nothing discharges 
may not adequately serve this function.389  Hybrid courts resolve these 
seemingly contradictory views by reasoning that while aggregate debt 
cannot be partially discharged, individual loans making up that aggregation 
can be discharged as necessary to prevent undue hardship.390  In other 
words, if a debtor has multiple student loans (as is often the case), some of 
those loans can be discharged while others can be deemed non-
dischargeable.  In fact, hybrid courts reason that treating separate debts 
collectively runs afoul of the plain language of the undue hardship 
statute.391
The In re Grigas court determined which of the debtor’s fifteen 
385 Id. at 196. 
386 In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 866. 
387 Id. at 867. 
388 In re Grigas, 252 B.R. at 872. 
389 Id. at 873. 
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
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loans were dischargeable by first determining that $224 was the maximum 
monthly student loan payment the debtor could make without experiencing 
undue hardship.392  The court then considered each loan in chronological 
order, oldest to newest, to ascertain whether it could be paid in full within 
15 years, using $224 per month as the original benchmark.393  Through this 
process, as loans are deemed fully payable, and therefore non-
dischargeable, the monthly amount is adjusted accordingly, leaving less 
money to pay later loans.394  For example, if Loan #1 was fully payable in 
15 years at $100 per month, Loan #2 would have to be payable in 15 years 
at no more than $124 per month in order to be non-dischargeable.  If a loan 
is too large to be fully repaid, that loan would be discharged and later loans 
would be considered until the maximum monthly allotment is depleted.395
This method advantages older loans and smaller loans. 
3. Empirical Studies 
An empirical study of student loan discharge cases confirmed that 
the ambiguity of the undue hardship standard resulted in inconsistent 
decisions.  Researchers reviewed undue hardship determinations rendered 
between October 7, 1993 and October 6, 2003.396  In total, the researchers 
reviewed 286 determinations, representing every federal circuit and 70% of 
the federal districts.397  The researchers found that 57% of the debtors were 
granted some form of undue hardship relief.398  When the researchers 
compared the group that received relief to the group that did not, they found 
an “overall lack of dissimilarity”399—meaning the two groups were virtually 
identical in relevant ways.  For example, the researchers found no 
statistically significant difference in the median monthly disposable 
household income,400 median levels of student loan debt, or median debt-to 
household ratios of the two groups.401  The researchers did find an 
392 Id. at 876. 
393 Id.  
394 Id. 
395 Id. 
396 Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 434 
(2005). 
397 Id. at 437. 
398 Id. at 479 (describing relief as being “in the form of full discharge, partial discharge, or 
equitable adjustment [e.g. abatement of accrual of interest, deferment of payment]”).
399 Id. at 481. 
400 Id. at 483. 
401 Id. at 484. 
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association between health problems and the granting of undue hardship 
relief, but concluded that the existence of health problems alone could not 
explain why some debtors received relief and others did not.402  As such, the 
researchers concluded that “problems of uncertainty and unequal treatment 
of debtors” were rife in undue hardship cases, “[undermining] the integrity 
of the system by producing haphazard results.”403
Another study by the same researchers found that the extent of 
undue hardship relief was based on factors other than those relevant to 
debtors’ ability to repay their loans.  The researchers studied 115 undue 
hardship proceedings that had been commenced between January 1, 2002 
and December 31, 2006 and resolved by August 2007.404  They chose to 
base their study in the Western District of Washington because it “appears 
to be a microcosm of the rest of the nation.”405  In 57% of the 115 cases, 
debtors received some form of undue hardship relief.406  A quarter of 
debtors who received relief were granted full discharges; half were granted 
discharges of about 71%.407  The average discharge was 62%.408  The 
researchers identified five determinants of the extent of discharge.409  Three 
of the five determinants were counsel’s years of experience; the identity of 
the judge assigned to the case; and whether the case was settled or went to 
trial.410  These are all factors that should be irrelevant to determining the 
merits of an undue hardship case; however, they make up a majority of the 
factors that determine undue hardship relief.   
These findings provide compelling support for a new framework for 
determining the propriety of student loan bankruptcy discharges.  This 
framework should be unambiguous and objective, thereby lending 
consistency to student loan discharge cases. 
402 Id. at 485 (“While an association certainly exists between (1) the poor health of the 
debtor and/or the poor health of the debtor's dependents and (2) the grant of 
discharge…that association alone does not explain the outcome in the undue hardship cases 
we have analyzed.”). 
403 Id. at 520. 
404 Pardo & Lacey, supra note 362, at 203. 
405 The researchers cited the Western District’s higher education attainment, percentage of 
college graduates with student loan debt, and bankruptcy filing rate to illustrate how the 
District’s demographics are similar to those of the nation.  Id. at 201. 
406 Id. at 213. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. 
409 Id. at 229. 
410 The other two determinants were the “aggregate factor count” (a cumulative measure of 
indicator variables designed by the researchers) and the amount of student loan debt for 
which discharge was being sought. Id. 
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VII. DEBT SERVICE THRESHOLDS AS OBJECTIVE BENCHMARKS 
This section will present a framework for using debt service 
thresholds to determine the propriety of federal student loan bankruptcy 
discharges.  The framework is centered around debt service thresholds 
because they provide critical, albeit less than absolute, objectivity to a 
process that is woefully subjective.  The goals of the framework are two-
fold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and uniform means of 
assessing the propriety of student loan discharges, and 2) to provide debtors 
facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a 
simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy.  
The 1994 Bankruptcy Commission lamented the “luck-of-the-draw 
justice” endemic of bankruptcy litigation.411  The Commission noted that 
throughout its review it heard complaints from debtors and creditors alike 
regarding inconsistency and subjectivity across the system.412  Before that, 
the 1970 Bankruptcy Commission observed that the “lack of uniform 
standards creates many variations in district court practices, and they, in 
turn, cause unequal treatment of creditors and debtors.”413 That Commission 
also identified four objectives of the administration of bankruptcy laws.414
Three of the four—impartiality, economy, and uniformity—are frustrated 
by inconsistency and subjectivity.  As such, bankruptcy laws should be 
clear, allowing for fair, efficient, and consistent resolution of cases. 
Simplicity is an essential component of any rule intent on fostering 
consistent results.  As argued by the 1994 Commission, “[a] relatively 
simple standard reduces litigation costs while it increases the predictability 
of outcomes…A simple standard also promotes consistency in application 
among different judges and different districts, increasing the likelihood that 
similar cases will be analyzed using similar legal principles.”415  The 1970 
Commission tied simplicity to access to bankruptcy.  It warned that the cost 
411 COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 81. 
412 Id. (“From the first hearing, the Commission heard from both debtors and creditors that 
some determinations that should apply consistently throughout the system have been left to 
individual judges and trustees.”).
413 COMMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 9, at 3. 
414 “There should be four objectives in the administration of the bankruptcy process: 
impartial, expert, and speedy performances of decision-making and other functions 
necessary to bring a case to a fruitful conclusion; economy that avoids waste, 
duplication, dilatoriness, an inefficiency; uniformity in case procedure and in the 
application of substantive laws throughout the United States; and managerial 
flexibility that can adjust quickly and efficiently to changes in quantity, kind, size, and 
location of cases.”  Id. at 81. 
415 COMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 248. 
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of bankruptcy litigation “is often disproportionate to the amounts of money 
involved,” resulting in “genuine controversies” being left unresolved.416
This point is important because many commentators have argued that “[t]he 
borrowers most likely to prevail [in bankruptcy] are those with the least 
possibility of being able to litigate the question.”417  As a result, the 1970 
Commission concluded that “substantive laws, procedural rules, and 
administrative practices should be simplified and clarified to permit broader 
debtor, creditor, and counselor participation [in the bankruptcy process].”418
Accordingly, “elaborate adjudication should be the exception, not the 
rule.”419
As discussed earlier, the fresh start notion and the post-bankruptcy 
discharge of debts are integral components of bankruptcy law.  However, 
the subjective and restrictive nature of the undue hardship standard renders 
these integral notions needlessly speculative for debtors facing crushing 
student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it.  The following 
proposed framework represents an impartial, economical, uniform and 
simplified alternative to the undue hardship standard.  
A. Proposed Framework 
In order to be eligible for discharge of federal student loans obtained in 
a bachelor’s degree (or lower) program:
 The debtor must have been in repayment for at least five years. 
In order to be eligible for discharge of federal student loans obtained in 
a graduate or professional school program: 
 The debtor must have been in repayment for at least ten years.   
In addition, the following criteria would apply to all debtors seeking 
federal student loan discharge: 
 The debtor must have participated in the federal Income-Based 
Repayment (IBR) Plan or a similar plan for at least three years for 
all student loans for which discharge is being sought. 
 The debtor’s Standard monthly payment amount (aggregated over 
the year) must have been above applicable maximum debt service 
thresholds for five consecutive years leading up to discharge. 
416 COMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 9, at 82. 
417 COMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 212. 
418 COMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 9, at 76. 
419 Id. at 82. 
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Upon discharge of student loans:  
 The debtor is ineligible to receive future federal student loans, 
unless discharged loans are reaffirmed.  
1. Mandatory Repayment Periods 
As the Heckathorn court stated, some level of debt-induced hardship 
is to be expected early in one’s post-college career.420  As such, the purpose 
of the mandatory repayment periods is to allow debtors an opportunity to 
realize some benefit from their education and to make loan payments before 
resorting to bankruptcy.  The mandatory repayment periods would be 
exclusive of grace periods, deferments, forbearances, and any other periods 
during which the debtor is not required to make payments.  The time 
periods can be non-consecutive. 
The five-year mandatory repayment period for bachelor’s degree (or 
lower) program debtors is borrowed from the original recommendation by 
the 1970 Commission that was later adopted by Congress in 1976.  The ten-
year mandatory repayment period for graduate and professional school 
program debtors mirrors the length of the Standard repayment period for 
federal loans.421
The purpose of the longer mandatory repayment period for graduate 
and professional school debtors is to allow them ample time to realize a 
payoff from their education before seeking discharge.  As discussed earlier, 
wages for workers with graduate or professional degrees exceed those 
associated with lower levels of education, and those wages have increased 
very robustly over the last 30 years.  Moreover, economic trends suggest 
that these workers will have an increasing advantage in the scrum for stable, 
well-paying employment going forward.   
BLS projects that through 2020, job growth will be greatest in 
occupations that require a master’s degree, followed by those requiring a 
doctoral or professional degree.422  Thus, a longer mandatory repayment 
period for these debtors is reasonable, given the favorable employment 
prospects afforded highly educated individuals in this country.  And to the 
420 In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 193. 
421 MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 25. 
422 BLS makes the following 2010-2020 projections (in order of intensity): Master’s 
degree: 21.7%, Doctoral or professional degree: 19.9; Associate’s degree: 18%; Some 
college: 17.5%; Postsecondary certificate: 16.9%; Bachelor’s degree: 16.5%; Less than 
high school: 14.1%; and High school diploma/GED: 12.2%.  Overall job growth is 
projected to be 14.3%. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS: 2010-20 (2012), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf. 
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extent that the solvency of the federal student loan program would be 
threatened by this framework, debtors in the best position to leverage their 
education in the job market should be encouraged to make payments on 
their loans, even if through an income-based plan. 
2. Participation in Income-Based Repayment Plan  
The requirement that debtors participate in a federally-sponsored 
income-based repayment plan for at least three years is intended to ensure 
that debtors take advantage of options other than bankruptcy before seeking 
discharge.  By reducing the debtor’s monthly payment, such plans may be 
effective at directing debtors away from bankruptcy.  
Currently, the federal government offers three income-based student 
loan repayment plans: Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plan; Income 
Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan; and Income-Sensitive Repayment 
Plan.423 IBR is the broadest of the plans, with applicability to all types of 
federal student loans,424 rendering the other plans virtually obsolete.  
Through IBR, debtors are required to pay no more than 10% of their 
“disposable income”—defined as the difference between their Adjusted 
Gross Income and 150% of the poverty level.425 The difference between 
payments made under the Standard plan and the IBR Plan can be significant 
for some debtors, with the latter being lower.426 Monthly payments are 
adjusted each year based on the debtor’s family and financial situation, and 
after 20 years, any remaining loan balance is canceled.427
3. Maximum Debt Service Thresholds 
Debt service thresholds will be used to determine whether a debtor’s 
student loan payments are high enough to warrant discharge.  Debt service, 
often expressed as a percentage, is essentially a measure of indebtedness.428
Unfortunately, there is no universally agreed upon definition or numerical 
423 Id. at 26 (providing an overview of all the income-based repayment plans and the types 
of loans to which they apply). 
424 Id.  
425 Id. 
426 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT PLAN, available 
at http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/IBRPlan.jsp (providing an 
example of a debtor whose payments under IBR would be less than half of Standard 
payments). 
427 MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 26.   
428 See, e.g., BAUM & SCHWARTZ, supra note 111. 
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threshold of over-indebtedness.429  Thus, defining what constitutes 
excessive debt is an inherently arbitrary exercise.  With that said, however, 
there are generally accepted benchmarks that are relied upon by loan 
underwriters and others who seek to assess loan risks.430  And while these 
benchmarks are not applicable to every debtor’s situation, they are 
nonetheless helpful at providing common bases upon which to assess a 
range of debtors.  
The maximum debt service thresholds for this framework were set 
using as guidance a model developed by researchers at the College Board.  
The College Board model uses income levels and the poverty rate to 
determine the maximum annual amount a debtor can dedicate to student 
loan payments.431  The model determines maximum annual student loan 
payments by applying a uniform debt service of 20% to an individual’s 
“disposable income”—defined as income above 150% of the poverty 
threshold.432
The framework proposed in this article is less generous than the 
College Board model.  Maximum debt service thresholds begin at 20% and 
reach as high as 30% of a debtor’s disposable income.  This graduated 
approach acknowledges, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, that individuals “with 
higher incomes can afford to devote a higher proportion of their incomes to 
debt payments without sacrificing basic expenditures.”433  In addition, the 
College Board’s threshold is intended to be a prudency standard, not 
necessarily a measure of when bankruptcy discharge is appropriate.   
The maximum annual amount a debtor can dedicate to student loan 
payments is calculated in the following manner: 
 Determine “disposable income” by calculating the difference 
between the debtor’s gross income and 150% of the federal poverty 
threshold for similarly-situated debtors.434  Gross income is defined 
as income from all sources, including employment and domestic 
429 BETTI ET AL., supra note 303, at 59 (“[T]here is currently no general agreement on the 
appropriate concepts of consumer indebtedness, on how to measure it or on where to draw 
the line between normal and excessive / over-indebtedness.”).
430 See, e.g., BAUM & SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 2 (describing the commonly-cited 
view that student loan payments should not encumber more than 8% of gross income). 
431 Id. at 11. 
432 Id. at 12. 
433 Id. at 11. 
434 The U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services publishes poverty guidelines each year.
Poverty thresholds are based principally on the number of persons in a family. For 
example, the poverty threshold for a 4-person family in the 48 contiguous states and DC is 
$22,350; the threshold is $14,710 for a 2-person family. Annual Update of the HHS 
Poverty Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 13 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/11fedreg.pdf.  
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support.  If the debtor is married and not separated, spouse’s income 
is also included in the gross income calculation. 
 The following student loan debt service thresholds are then applied 
to the disposable income calculation: 





So a debtor with gross income of $40,000 and a family size of three 
(including the debtor herself) will have disposable income of $12,205—
which is the difference between the debtor’s gross income and 150% of the 
poverty threshold ($27,795) for her family.  The applicable student loan 
debt service threshold is 20%--which means that for purposes of her 
bankruptcy petition, the maximum amount this debtor could dedicate to 
student loan payments for the year in question is $2,441, or 6% of her gross 
income.  Student loan obligations above that amount would render the 
payments, in effect, an undue hardship for that year. 
Higher gross income or smaller family size can lead to higher 
maximum annual student loan payments.  For example, a debtor with gross 
income of $60,000 and a family size of three would have disposable income 
of $32,205 ($60,000 - $27,795).  The applicable student loan debt service 
threshold is 20%--which means that for purposes of his bankruptcy petition, 
the maximum amount this debtor could dedicate to student loan payments 
for the year in question is $6,441, or about 11% of his gross income. 
A debtor with gross income of $40,000 and a family size of one 
would have disposable income of $23,665 ($40,000 - $16,335).  The 
applicable student loan debt service threshold is 20%--which means that for 
purposes of her bankruptcy petition, the maximum amount this debtor could 
dedicate to student loan payments for the year in question is $4,733, or 
about 12% of her gross income. 
4. Five Years of Above-Maximum Payments 
In order to be eligible for discharge, the debtor’s monthly payments 
(aggregated over the year) must exceed the stipulated maximum amounts 
for five consecutive years.  Calculations will be made for each relevant year 
to account for changes in salary, poverty thresholds, and payment 
obligations.   
The Standard repayment plan will be used to determine payment 
obligations, even if the debtor made payments under an income-based plan.  
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The proposed framework requires debtors to enroll in such a plan, in order 
to lower their monthly payments.  But relying on these lower payments in 
determining eligibility for discharge would essentially punish the debtor.  
Thus, reliance on the Standard plan (which represents the maximum most 
debtors can be obligated to pay) is premised on the idea that debtors should 
not be punished for attempting to lower their payments and exhaust options 
short of discharge.   
Further, an income-based repayment plan should not be considered a 
substitute for bankruptcy discharge.  One court argued that such a 
consideration allows judges to abdicate their responsibility of determining 
appropriate bankruptcy relief.435  Additionally, adherence to an income-
based repayment plan can yield a non-dischargeable tax obligation for the 
debtor.  For example, after 20 years of making payments through the IBR 
Plan, any remaining loan balance is canceled; but the debtor may be 
required to report this canceled balance as taxable income.436  As the 
Bronsdon court put it, debtors should not be forced to trade “a non-
dischargeable student loan debt for a non-dischargeable tax debt.”437
Debtors with multiple loans can choose on which loans to seek 
discharge; however, loans must be discharged in chronological order, from 
newest to oldest.  The latter restriction is an intuitive response to the ordinal 
manner in which degrees are earned, and means that in all but the rarest 
cases, debtors with graduate or professional school loans will have to 
successfully discharge those loans prior to being able to discharge 
bachelor’s degree (or lower) loans.  
For purposes of determining discharge eligibility, a debtor’s 
payments on all student loans will be considered, even if the debtor is not 
seeking discharge on all loans.  The purpose of this approach is to give the 
court complete insight into the debtor’s financial picture.
5. Reestablishing Loan Eligibility 
Debtors could reestablish eligibility for federal student loans by 
satisfying the Federal Student Aid (FSA) process for restoring loan 
eligibility—essentially reaffirming their discharged student loan debt.  FSA 
435 Denittis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Denittis), 362 B.R. 57, 64 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2007) (“To hold that debtors must participate in [an income-based repayment plan], if 
eligible, would be no more than the Court abdicating its responsibility to determine the 
dischargeability of a student loan. If this is the outcome Congress intended, it would have 
said so”.).
436 MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 26. 
437 Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 803 (Bankr. 1st 
Cir. 2010). 
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provides four options for restoring loan eligibility to debtors who have 
defaulted: 1) pay the loans in full; 2) make six payments of an agreed 
amount over a six month period; 3) consolidate loans through a federally-
approved program; or 4) rehabilitate the loans.438  Debtors would be limited 
to one reaffirmation.  A subsequent bankruptcy discharge would render the 
debtor permanently ineligible to receive federal student loans.   
6. Scope 
The proposed framework would apply to federal loans only.  Student 
loans secured in the private market would fall outside the framework’s 
purview.  The author believes that private loans should be dischargeable to 
the same extent as other unsecured debt.439  This view is influenced by the 
fact that eligibility for a private educational loan is based on a borrower’s 
creditworthiness, not an “enlightened” policy of broadening educational 
access.  As such, private lenders are able to minimize their exposure to 
credit risks.  Thus, these loans should not be given the same special 
treatment afforded federal loans, the vast majority for which 
creditworthiness is not considered. 
B. Issues Affecting Framework Implementation 
Implementation of the proposed framework would be affected 
mainly by issues related to costs and politics.  
1. Costs 
A potential criticism of the framework is that it would increase the 
cost of bankruptcy, thus, disadvantaging the debtors it seeks to help.  In the 
aftermath of the 2005 Act, filing bankruptcy became more expensive both 
438 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, GOING BACK TO SCHOOL, available at
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/going.back.to.school.html. See also, U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, LOAN REHABILITATION,
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/rehabilitation.html (describing loan rehabilitation 
as making “at least nine [9] full payments of an agreed amount within twenty [20] days of 
their monthly due dates over a ten [10] month period”).
439 Prior to 1984, student loans obtained from an entity other than a “non-profit institution 
of higher education” were treated the same in bankruptcy as other unsecured debt.  
However, Congress eventually granted private student loans equivalent status to federal 
student loans in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Student Loan Bankruptcy Exception, FINAID,
available at http://www.finaid.org/questions/bankruptcyexception.phtml.  
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in terms of filing fees and the cost of legal representation.440  Filing fee 
increases were statutory in nature.441 Increases in attorney’s fees, while not 
technically statutory, were nonetheless the result of the Act’s heightened 
reporting and disclosure obligations.  These obligations, including those 
related to the means test, “increased the average amount of time an attorney 
spent on each case”, and thus resulted in higher fees.442
Proving eligibility for discharge under this framework would of 
course require an attorney’s time.  But whether that time commitment 
would be greater than what is already dedicated to determining undue 
hardship is unknown.  One of the benefits of the framework is heightened 
simplicity and efficiency.  Thus, it seems entirely possible that the 
framework could lead to less time expended by attorneys determining their 
client’s eligibility for discharge.  If so, lower attorney’s fees could result.
2. Political Environment 
As discussed earlier, the implications of student loan indebtedness 
have taken on heightened prominence as debt levels have increased 
drastically.  Proposed solutions to student loan overindebtedness are varied, 
ranging from an expansion of income-based repayment options,443 to a call 
for forgiveness of all student loan debt,444 to a counterproductive 
encouragement of voluntary defaults by student loan debtors.445  There are 
even some who believe the federal government should get out of the student 
loan business altogether.446  Passions run high on all sides.  Thus, proposed 
440 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf (concluding that attorney’s fees rose an average 
of 51% in Chapter 7 cases and 55% in Chapter 13 cases, while filing fees rose 43% in 
Chapter 7 cases and 41% in Chapter 13 cases). 
441 Id. at 5. 
442 Id. at 27. 
443 See, e.g., COLLEGE BOARD, FULFILLING THE COMMITMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REFORMING FEDERAL STUDENT AID 18 (2008), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/rethinking-stu-aid-fulfilling-
commitment-recommendations.pdf. 
444 Robert Applebaum, Obama’s Student Loan Reforms: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 
FORGIVESTUDENTLOANDEBT (Oct. 28, 2011), available at 
http://forgivestudentloandebt.com/content/obamas-student-loan-reforms-right-problem-
wrong-solution.  
445 See, e.g., Lynn O'Shaughnessy, Is Occupy Student Debt Pledge Drive a Bust?, 
CBSNEWS (Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-
57341046/is-occupy-student-debt-pledge-drive-a-bust/. 
446 See, e.g., Richard Vedder, Subsidizing the College Bubble, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2011), 
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reforms often elicit fierce support and even fiercer criticism.   
Given that the solvency of the student loan system has been an 
enduring, though exaggerated, justification for restricting discharge of 
student loan debt, the proposed framework was developed paying particular 
attention to ensuring that only debtors who are legitimately facing crushing 
debt and few prospects for repaying it would be incentivized to seek 
discharge.  The framework acknowledges that many student loan debtors 
would benefit from bankruptcy relief, but also appreciates that a limitless 
expansion of such relief would be both inadvisable and politically 
untenable.   
CONCLUSION 
With the cost of higher education and reliance on student loans both 
rising, an increasing number of debtors will become overburdened with 
student loan debt.  This trend will be exacerbated by dismal educational 
outcomes, stubbornly high unemployment, and stagnant wages.  As such an 
increasing number of student loan debtors will seek out bankruptcy relief. 
The proposed framework was developed to effectively address this 
trend by rendering the bankruptcy system fairer to federal student loan 
debtors and their creditors—essentially, the taxpayers.  The current system 
of determining undue hardship is rife with ambiguity and subjectivity; 
therefore, it should be undone, replaced by a framework that relies on 
objective measures and lends itself to impartiality, economy, uniformity, 
and simplicity. 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/27/should-college-grads-get-
a-break-on-their-loans/subsidizing-the-college-bubble.  
